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Abstract 
Europeanization has become a key concept to changes due to transfer of 
competences to EU level. While extensive research has been performed on 
institutional dynamics and also on the rise of private interest representation at EU-
level, little is said about domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) and their 
integration in EU politics. By zooming out of Brussels we come to realize that 
also domestic CSOs are starting to recognize the importance of engaging in EU 
politics.   
 
By applying two of the few existing theoretical frameworks dealing with 
Europeanization of domestic organizations on two cases were domestic CSOs are 
engaging in EU politics, namely the debate over licensed hunt on wolfs and the 
question if non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from 
paying and register VAT or not, this study aimed at contribute to theory 
development.  
 
From the cases studies we could see that domestic CSOs were using a multitude 
of strategies when engaging in EU politics taking place at both domestic and EU 
level. The study emphasizes that one must recognize both vertical and horizontal 
interactions. When doing this it becomes obvious that domestic CSOs can shape 
alliances with both institutional actors, other CSOs and EU based CSOs to 
compensate for lack of resources and EU competence. The CSOs are learning and 
building competences of how to engage in EU politics from a national level. By 
networking and using alternative strategies also domestic CSOs has proven 
important actors in EU politics in my two cases. Actions at both levels were 
intertwined and therefore when trying to predict the Europeanization of domestic 
CSOs one must go about such predictions carefully and with respect for the 
multitude of factors that come into play in such a process.  
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1 Introduction  
Member states entering the European Union (EU) has in many ways affected the coordination 
of public policies and could be seen as one of the most prominent political changes in our 
times (Lundberg 2012:7). Within academic research the transforming powers of EU are 
referred to as Europeanization and we are experiencing an ever growing interest in the 
subject. The primary focus within the Europeanization literature has been on how EU 
integration and transferred legislative competences affects policy adaption at the domestic 
level (e.g. Cowles, Carporaso & Risse 2001; Graziano & Vink 2008; Olsen 2002). In the ever 
growing literature on Europeanization there has also been a focus on what could be described 
as “the usual suspects” when dealing with policy processes. I am referring to governmental 
institutions, politicians and civil servants. By aiming our attention away from the most 
apparent targets of institutional change we will come to recognize also other actors that have 
taken place on the European political arena.  
 
Simply by looking at the large representation of non-governmental actors in Brussels we are 
given a hint that what is going on in EU is not only a public institutional matter. The 
background to this rise of a European non-governmental sphere could be connected back to a 
crisis in democratic legitimacy that emerged within the Union in the 1990
ths. 
 In 2001 the 
Commission launched a white paper on European governance. This was done mainly to find 
ways of increasing democratic legitimacy and gain support from European citizen for the 
European Project. EU wanted to improve the public image through better regulation, good 
governance, support of and partnership with civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) 
then become important collaborators to the Commission, both to increase legitimacy but also 
to provide competence and knowledge that were needed for the EU institutions to handle a 
larger administrative burden (Kröger 2008:5). The development of a non-governmental 
sphere at EU level existing of both private interest groups in EU and the birth of several EU 
based CSOs has caused an increase in research on private interest representation at EU level 
in Brussels (Smismans, 2003, 2008; Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009).  
 
Actors that are not yet as present in the Europeanization literature are domestic CSOs, 
naturally because they are not as present in Brussels. However, just because are not 
particularly visible in Brussels does not mean they are not engaged in EU politics. As Ruzza 
and Bozzini (2008) describe it, domestic CSOs are too starting to recognize the importance of 
addressing the EU political environment, but not only by going to Brussels. 
 
The empirical evidence for my statements above I have come to find in two cases of domestic 
CSOs involvement in EU related questions. The two questions I am referring to are both 
Swedish cases and include first the debate over licensed hunt on wolfs and second the 
question if non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from paying and 
register VAT or not. Both these questions are closely linked and in some aspects dependent 
on the two EU directives, the Habitats directive and the VAT directive. The two debates have 
to a large extent been raised by Swedish CSOs acting either to resist the implementation of an 
EU-directive (the VAT-directive) or to use an EU- directive (the Habitats directive) to gain 
support for their cause to stop the hunting of wolf in Sweden. In the case of the wolf hunt, 
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conservation organizations are acting through the EU, against the Swedish government to 
prevent licensed hunt of wolfs in Sweden because of the unfavorable conservation status of 
the species. In the case of non-profit organizations exemptions from VAT, Swedish 
organizations are acting in alliance with the Swedish government to try to keep existing 
national legislation.  
 
The two cases that I will use in this text to hopefully develop actor centered Europeanization 
theory, are quite unusual and unique so far. However as stated both in research and by my 
informants these are scenarios that surly will appear again in the close future. By addressing 
these domestic CSOs through Europeanization theory, I believe that we can discover a 
broader and more diverse set of possible routes to influence national as well as EU-level 
politics and better understand the possibilities the domestic CSOs have to Europeanize their 
lobbying activities.   
 
As we are entering a possible new era of civil society – public institutional relationship in EU 
and its member states, where also domestic CSOs starts to engage in EU policy matters I 
believe it is relevant to use these cases as a way to describe what can happen when the power 
has gone to Brussels and domestic CSOs starts to recognize that and acts upon it.  
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1.1 Research aim 
My ambition with this thesis is first to bring in domestic CSOs into the Europeanization 
literature. By making in depth case studies of two political processes where domestic CSOs 
are engaging in EU politics I hope to provide useful empirical observations on political actors 
that not yet have been addressed extensively in the Europeanization literature. Secondly I 
hope to contribute to refined theory on Europeanization of domestic CSOs by taking a stamp 
in two of the few existing theoretical frameworks of Europeanization of non-governmental 
actors and discuss those theories in relation to the empirical material in the case studies.  
 
By seeing Europeanization from a CSO perspective while at the same time analyzing the 
CSOs in relation to a larger political context that affects their behavior, I can hopefully 
display those constrains the organizations faces when engaging in EU politics. I also believe I 
can point out the possibilities that arise when the CSOs interact with other actors to purse 
their individual goals.  
 
Discussing the CSOs strategies and factors that seem important to them when engaging in EU 
politics, in relation to theory, I hope to contribute to theory development within the 
Europeanization literature and clear the path for further research on a subject that seems to 
become more and more relevant as we speak.  
1.1.1 Research question 
What strategies are employed by domestic CSOs when interacting with the EU? 
 
What factors are relevant for explaining the organizations actions and strategies in the 
different situations of interactions with the EU?  
 
1.1.2 Definitions 
In this text there will show up different appellations for those organizations that different 
researchers including myself are approaching. Klüvers theoretical framework which is the one 
I am deriving from is made up by studying a form of private interest groups namely 
agricultural groups, whereas I am studying Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are built 
on a non-profit ground. CSOs is used as to encompass various other terms that might be 
relevant in discussing civil society actors, such as civil association, Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), advocacy network, third sector, etc. 
As Kaldor (2003:15) puts it, the term Civil Society Organization has the advantage of 
stressing its identity in its own rights, in contrast to the terms that define these actors against 
governments or corporations. The term non-profit will be used in the VAT case to explain 
what kinds of organizations that are exempted from VAT. This is done because the non-profit 
term is what is used in public documents on the question.   
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2 Theory 
This chapter starts with a presentation of the general conceptions of Europeanization. The 
debate concerning Europeanization provides an important context in which the focus of this 
research should be understood. Furthermore I suggest an incorporation of CSOs in the 
theoretical debate, explain why this is important and present the theories that this study will 
use. The chapter ends with a discussion of existing theory on Europeanization of CSOs and 
suggestions on how the subject can be approached in a different manner for more accurate 
results.  
2.1 Introducing Europeanization  
Increased European integration constitutes the basis for the more recently adopted concept of 
Europeanization. Because of its complexity Europeanization research has come to include a 
debate on whether to study Europeanization from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective. The 
top-down approach refers here to impacts of new EU institutions on member states political 
structures and process and the bottom-up approach refers to the European Union as the 
emergence of EU institutions that brings new norms, policies and practices (Börzel 
2002:193).  
 
One of the most prominent so called top-down approaches to Europeanization is developed by 
Caporaso et al. (2001:3). They propose to understand by Europeanization: 
 
…the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of 
political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among 
the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules”. 
 
Europeanization is seen as a process that brings in new layers of politics that interact with the 
already existing ones. Europeanization is thus about seeing the EU institutions and the EU 
legislation that is now interacting with domestic politics as well as making distinctions 
between European and domestic politics, policies and institutions. 
 
Radaelli (2003) is another prominent Europeanization researcher. He presents a more 
comprehensive definition where he incorporates both mechanisms and effects of 
Europeanization, such as:  
 
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing’ things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003:30). 
 
Radaelli argues that the particularity of the domestic context must be considered to a large 
extent. He sees the effects of Europeanization but recognizes mediating factors that come into 
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play. He asks himself whether it is the national institutions, norms and ideas that make the 
Europeanization possible. Are the national institutions capable of infusing change, do they 
have the administrative and or economic capacity? However, Radaelli also recognize the 
bottom-up effects, that is the process of creating policies, politics and polities that are highly 
affected of member states preferences and policies.  
 
Even though it is important to recognize the double nature of Europeanization most scholars 
including myself chose to focus on either the top-down or the bottom-up approach when 
studying the phenomenon empirically. The reasons for this will be discussed more when 
presenting the methodological challenges of this study. 
 
I have chosen to derive from the definition of Europeanization presented by Caporaso et al 
(2001) as a process that brings in new layers of politics that interact with those already there. 
Many scholars before me have used this approach. However, I will use the concept to 
understand the position of a certain kind of political actors that has not previously been 
addressed extensively by Europeanization research, namely domestic CSOs. The reason for 
the lack of both empirical and theoretical considerations on Europeanization of domestic 
CSOs is what I now will turn to.  
 
 
2.2 Research on actor centered Europeanization  
As stated in the introduction, the rise of non-governmental sphere in Brussels has led to an 
increase in research on private interest representation at EU level (Smismans, 2003, 2008; 
Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009). While the non-governmental actors 
in Brussels have gotten much attention from researchers not as many have looked into 
possible changes in national interest representation in relation to European integration (for 
exceptions see e.g. Kendall 2010; Sanchez-Salgado 2007). As domestic CSOs generally have 
not considered themselves to be engaging with EU policy it is not strange that these 
organizations have not attracted the interest of Europeanization researchers. Because 
approaching EU institutions includes substantial constrains in terms of the effectiveness of 
these activities in comparison to what they cost (McCartyhy and Zald 1977:1220) research 
has also come to exclude domestic CSOs as organization as they often are considered weak in 
terms of resources. 
 
It is too early to speak of an Europeanization of domestic civil society in EU member states 
since much evidence still show that the majority of civil society is not recognizing EU politics 
as relevant to them (Kendall 2010:57). This, however, does not mean that it is unimportant to 
investigate what transferred competence to EU means for domestic CSOs. Just like Ruzza and 
Bozzini (2008) describe and as my two cases will display, national CSOs are starting to 
recognize the importance of engaging in EU politics, if yet in another way than by 
establishing representation in Brussels which is what other non-governmental actors has done.  
 
By broadening the picture and recognizing that civil society can be a critical voice towards 
both the national government and towards EU institutions also national civil society actors 
becomes an interesting group to pay attention to when studying Europeanization. As my two 
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cases show, domestic CSOs have engaged in EU politics not just by recognizing the relevance 
of EU policy but also by approaching EU institutions directly as well as acting towards the 
national government in order to encourage them to influence EU institutions in a way that 
promotes the opinions of the CSOs.  
 
As I see it there is no theory today that can fully explain the Europeanization of national 
CSOs as displayed in my case studies. However, some first attempts have been made to map 
both the possible ways that national non-governmental organizations can try to influence 
questions were EU holds the legislative power and what mediating factors that are important 
to manage such processes. So instead of starting from scratch I have decided to make use of 
these theories in an attempt to develop them and hence get a better and more comprehensive 
understanding of Europeanization of domestic CSOs.  
2.3 Europeanization of interest groups – A top-down 
approach 
Heike Klüver’s (2010) theory on Europeanization of lobbying activities is one of the few 
attempts made where research is connecting the Europeanization literature with non-
governmental organizations as actors. Klüver argue that “an increased transfer of competence 
to European institutions due to the shaping of a single market, the Euro-system and an overall 
enlargement of policy areas that is now dealt with at EU level, all contributes to put 
adaptional pressure not only on governmental institutions but also on interest groups. Interest 
groups cannot longer only address the domestic institutions to influence politics, but now has 
to face the EU level as well” (Klüver 2010:177). Even though many EU based umbrella 
organizations have showed up lately, the national interest groups cannot according to Klüver 
rely solely on them to speak for their cause. These EU based organizations and networks 
represents such a heterogeneous group of organizations that it is only very few questions that 
the members all have in common (Greenwood 2007:15)  and therefore can rely on the EU 
organizations to act within (Klüver 2010:176). Nationally based interest groups therefore need 
to see for themselves that they address the EU institutions directly where it is needed. Klüver 
refers to this as Europeanization of national interest groups (Klüver 2010:176). The 
adaptional pressure from EU seems however to affect the interest groups very differently. Not 
all interest groups are Europeanizing and how this variation should be explained is somewhat 
contested (Klüver 2010:176).  
 
Europeanization theory is often built on two assumptions: that impact of EU institutions on 
member states is varied (1) and that differentiated impact can be explained by mediating 
factors (2) (Börzel 2005) (Klüver 2010:176). Klüver also build theory on the assumption that 
national interest groups are maximizing their influence in order to achieve their goals. Hence, 
the organizations select the most profitable lobbying strategy. The organizations are however 
constrained by their amount of resources (McCartyhy and Zald 1977:1220). Since the 
organizations make rational calculations of whether Europeanizing lobbying activities is 
beneficial or not the choices made by the organizations, according to Klüver, also rely on the 
national institutional context and the possibility for the organization to get recognition for 
their cause at that level.  
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From these assumptions of Europeanization the following theoretical framework is presented 
by Klüver: 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical framework presented by Klüver (2010:178) to explain Europeanization 
of interest groups lobbying activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Mediating factors  
Interest groups want to maximize their influence but have limited resources. Lobbying is 
about exchanging goods between decision makers and interest groups (Klüver 2010:179, 
Bouwen 2002). Successful lobbying within in the EU could therefore be said to depend on the 
ability of the interest group to give the EU institutions the goods that they want. In order to do 
that three resource factors, previously mentioned in the figure, are necessary. Financial and 
personnel resources are needed to provide EU institution with the requested expertise. EU 
institutions are continuously understaffed and are therefore in need of expertise coming from 
the outside. The interest groups need to be able to handle tasks such as following a decision 
making process, elaborate statements and reports, and participate in hearings and 
consultations. It has also been proved that being present in Brussels matters when it comes to 
influencing the European decision makers (Klüver 2010:179). The third factor, 
representativeness, is important because of EUs will to increase the legitimacy of the union. 
Efforts have been made to increase democratic standards and therefore the Commission is 
particularly interested in listening to interest groups with large constituency, to be prepared 
Necessary condition: 
Transfer of competence to the 
European Union 
Adaptional pressure 
Mediating conditions: 
National institutional 
context 
- Distribution of 
power 
- Inter ediation 
patterns  
Mediating conditions: 
Resources: 
- Financial 
resources 
- Personell 
resources 
- Representativness  
 
Europeanization of lobbying 
activities 
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for the reactions of large parts of the stakeholders to certain proposals. Klüver concludes that 
the more recourse the interest group has the more likely they are to Europeanize their 
activities (Klüver 2010:179).  
 
The national institutional context can be said to include two factors, namely distribution of 
power, which has to do different levels of access points for interest groups to institutional 
environments and interest intermediation, which has to do with the system that is made up by 
corporatism, pluralism or statism (Klüver 2010:180).Corporatism is characterized by high 
levels of inclusion of interest groups in the decision making, pluralism is a middle way and 
statism offers the most closed system to interest groups. Klüver builds on these categories and 
argue that interest groups in a centralized state are more likely to Europeanize their lobbying 
activities than other states. This because of the compensation hypothesis which assumes that 
additional venues provided by the EU are especially attractive for those excluded from 
national policy communities (Richardson 2000:1013 and Beyers 2002). . The same goes for 
the intermediating conditions; the more open the domestic system, the less interested the 
interest groups are to approach the EU level and Europeanize their lobbying activities. 
(Klüver 2010:181).  
2.4 Alternative routes to Europeanization of domestic 
CSOs 
While Klüvers theory is useful to connect the Europeanization literature with non-
governmental organization as actors and show what demands that are put on the organizations 
to Europeanize their activities, Ruzza and Bozzinis (2008) theory is helpful in providing 
alternative strategies that the CSOs can use to Europeanize their lobbying activities besides 
the strategy of establishing representativeness in Brussels as described in Klüvers model.  
 
Ruzza and Bozzini present four possible routes for CSOs to approach EU policy that can 
perhaps help us broaden the view on Europeanizing activities. The routes are: 
a) The Traditional route where CSOs continue their political work only towards the national 
government and recognize EU only in terms of EU legislation. The organizations do not 
address the EU institutions or try to influence the EU policy process, but can if they want to 
refer to EU policy when claiming their cause at national level  
b) The National route where CSOs mobilize at a national level in order to influence EU 
policy through the national government. The CSOs lobby towards the national government 
with the purpose of having indirect influence on EU institutions and policy processes. This 
path is often chosen when CSOs sees potential in the national government to affect EU-
policy. 
c) The European route up where the organization participates at EU level to influence EU 
policy. This route is seen by Ruzza and Bozzini as a route taken almost exclusively by EU 
based CSOs because it, like Klüver states, demands high levels of resources to achieve 
effective lobbying at EU level. Because of the demands on both sectorial and political 
knowledge it can only be pursued by organizations with constant presence in Brussels. 
d) The European route down which includes participation in EU based activities in order to 
influence national policy processes. This route is not obvious in Klüvers theory where 
Europeanization is seen as something that solely has to do with influencing EU policy. As the 
traditional route where EU policy could be used to influence the national government this is 
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another example of where EU can become a possibility for organizations to influence national 
policymaking by engaging EU institutions for their cause  (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008:298-299). 
 
2.5 Developing approaches to the Europeanization of 
domestic CSOs 
 
Both Ruzza and Bozzini as well as Klüver all agree that European policy is recognized by 
national CSOs as something they need to deal with at the same time as the awareness does not 
correspond to the level of interaction with EU since this requires high amounts of resources 
and knowledge (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008:301, Klüver 2010:179). While Klüver elaborates on 
mediating factors, Ruzza and Bozzini are simply mentioning them in their study which is why 
Klüvers theory is needed for the purpose of this study, even though I will come to criticize her 
conclusions.    
 
The differences between the theories is that Ruzza and Bozzini are taking a more overarching 
approach to Europeanization where they recognize Europeanizing activities at both national 
and EU-level. CSOs either use EU institution or policy to change national legislation or use 
the national government and/or EU-based CSOs to affect EU-policy. Since non-governmental 
actors are participating in EU-policy making and implementation it is important to consider 
both the horizontal (national level) and vertical interactions (EU-level with institutional actors 
when studying the Europeanization of these actors, as well as trying to distinguish between 
different explanatory factors in both ways (Saurugger 2005:305). By adopting Ruzza and 
Bozzinis alternative routes to EU the CSOs can be seen as separate units within a 
multidimensional political context. This makes it easier to understand what possibilities CSOs 
have and under what conditions the CSOs Europeanize their activities. 
 
In the Wolf hunt case it becomes apparent that transferred competence to EU creates a 
possibility for the organizations to influence policy at the national level. In the VAT case we 
see that the relationship between the national government and the different CSOs becomes 
highly relevant for how the process is played out. However, Klüvers mediating factors will be 
challenged by relational factors that will prove important to understand the Europeanization 
of non-governmental actors.  
 
Also Klüver recognize the interactions between CSOs and the national government, but she 
does it from a somewhat different perspective. Klüver is focusing on the compensations 
hypothesis where CSOs who are not recognized for their cause at the national level are more 
eager to pursue their goals at EU level. By focusing only on the vertical interaction Klüver 
ignores that even when the national government recognizes the CSOs whishes they might also 
need their help when working against EU institutions. Hence CSOs that get recognition for 
their cause at national level could also get engaged in Europeanizing activities by joining 
forces with the national government. Klüver dismisses all other activities than establishing 
representativeness in Brussels as effective in EU politics and therefore exclude actions at the 
national level or between CSOs and national representatives in Brussels. As my cases will 
show the two-way dependency that Klüver, with the help of Bouwen (2002), describes 
between EU institutions and non-governmental actors is not the only relevant relationship to 
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understand Europeanization. To clarify these statements the alternative routes presented by 
Ruzza and Bozzini are helpful.  
 
What neither of the theories recognizes is how organizations can pool resources and thus get 
engaged in ways of Europeanizing their lobbying activities that are resource demanding. The 
European route up and down are for example not taken only by EU based CSOs like Ruzza 
and Bozzini suggest. Today there are both formal and informal ways for also national CSOs 
to approach EU institutions directly by allying with other national CSOs and share the 
resources.  
 
Additionally both theories regard EU as one unit and explain CSOs lobbying towards EU as 
highly resource demanding and only open to experienced EU lobbyists. By separating the EU 
institutions one could perhaps get a somewhat different view on what is demanded from the 
organizations who wish to influence them. The European Parliament is for example 
supposedly more opened towards the public since they are politically elected and should thus 
be more accessible for organizations who wish to influence them.  
 
Another aspect that the cases in this study show is that different strategies are used 
simultaneously. This makes it difficult to distinguish between them when investigating the 
processes since they are intertwined and affect each other. Separating the routes as done by 
Ruzza and Bozzini is helpful when presenting the CSOs strategies descriptively but in the 
analysis it must be recognized that actions taken at both the national and the European level 
interact with each other.   
 
For the analysis of the two cases I will use both Klüver and Ruzza and Bozzinis theories in 
order to explain the actions taken by the CSOs in each case. Where the theories do not cover 
the empiricism I will try to complement the theories with factors and aspects that seem 
important for the understanding of Europeanization of CSOs.  
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3 Method 
In this chapter I will present how the investigation has been conducted. I will explain my 
choice of cases and how the cases should be understood as well as discuss the methods used 
for gathering the empirical material. Additionally I will put effort into explaining those 
methodological challenges that research on Europeanization faces according to Saurugger 
(2005) and how these challenges has been handled in this investigation. At the end I discuss 
how the material will be analyzed and make some final remarks on what should be expected 
of this study. 
3.1 Case study research – description of the process  
I have conducted two within-case studies. As in most cases studies it has been an interactive 
process (George & Bennet 2005:89) that started in an interest in understanding what EU has 
meant for CSOs. The interest came from the increased focus put on civil society both in the 
EU context and at national level.  
 
While searching through the example of CSOs engagement in EU related matters, a phase that 
George & Bennet refers to as  “Soaking and Poaking” (George & Bennet 2005:89) it showed 
that some CSOs have started to incorporate EU in their work but that long term engagement 
in EU related questions are still quite rare. Two cases that stood out in the Swedish context 
were the question on exemptions from VAT for non-profit organizations and the questions 
on whether or not approving licensed hunt on wolfs. In both of these cases Swedish CSOs 
have engaged in EU related questions and actively tried to influence policy either at EU level 
or at the national level through EU Institutions.  
 
Going through the literature on Europeanization, that has become a large research field for 
both political scientists as well as for researchers in other disciplines, I could see that the 
definitions of Europeanization was contested (Saurugger 2005:293). I could also see that most 
research performed on non-governmental actors were about those actors present and active in 
Brussels (Saurugger 2005:295). What I couldn’t find to the same extent, were theoretical 
considerations on domestic CSOs involvement in EU related questions in the ways that had 
raised my interest in the two previously mentioned cases.   
 
When I started to dig deeper in the involvement of domestic CSOs in European politics I 
begun to realize the complexity of such processes and I also experienced that I had problem 
explaining my cases theoretically and therefore saw a need to investigate it further. 
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3.2 Case selection  
The important question to ask when choosing a case is what is this a case of? (May 
2011:231). Instead of focusing on private interest groups with high levels of resources (those 
that according to Klüver (2010) are the most likely to Europeanize their activities) I have 
chosen cases that includes the engagement of domestic CSOs in EU related questions. These 
cases include both smaller organizations with low levels of recourse as well as bigger 
organizations with more resources but that still faces constrains when engaging in EU politics 
and thus not would be what Klüver would define as resource strong organizations.   
 
Tabel 1: Possible relations between CSOs, the national government and the EU institutions in 
policies where legislative competences has been transferred to EU 
 
 CSOs pro EU policy CSOs against EU policy 
Government pro EU policy Q1 Consensus Q2 Conflict government and  EU 
against CSOs 
 
Government against EU policy Q3 Conflict government against 
CSOs and EU 
Wolf hunt case   
Q4 Consensus government and 
CSOs against EU 
VAT case 
 
As you can see in table 1 there are four possible scenarios for CSOs in EU related matters 
when it comes to CSOs relationship to the national government and EU. In Q1 there is 
consensus among all parts, in Q2 there is conflict situation with both EU and the government. 
This is an interesting scenario; however I have chosen not to address this in my investigation 
since I am interested in explaining how CSOs act when there is a disagreement between the 
national government and EU. It is fair to assume that the possibilities for CSOs to be 
successful in their demands when they are up against both EU and the national government 
are quite small. Therefore neither cases that fall into this category are suitable for 
investigating the resources that CSOs draw upon in relation to Europeanization. Further 
investigations on what happens to CSOs that now faces two institutional powers instead of 
one I leave for other researchers to take on. The cases I have chosen are from, those situations 
displayed in Q3 and Q4. 
3.2.1 The cases 
A more thorough presentation of each case will be done as part of the results of this study. 
Here I will point put what I aim to get out of the cases and explain some limitations. While 
the VAT case show us a situation where the CSOs are in consensus with the government 
against EU policy the Wolf hunt case displays a situation of conflict between the CSOs and 
the national government in a question where EU law rules. The VAT case is made up by the 
actions taken by four CSOs that have been more active than other organizations work to resist 
changes in regulations on whether non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted 
from paying and register  VAT or not. The organizations are displayed in table 2 under 
informants. The VAT case will come to display Europeanizing activities at both national level 
and at EU level and it includes interaction with both the national government and EU 
institutions.  
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The Wolf hunt case includes the study of four organizations work towards the European 
Commission in order to achieve policy change at national level. The question stand over 
licensed hunt on wolfs where the Swedish government as well as other CSOs are pro such 
hunt but where the CSOs I will study are against. As in the VAT case these are not the only 
active organizations but they are those who have engaged in approaching EU institutions. 
This case deals mostly with the CSOs interaction at EU level. The cases should be seen as 
complementary to each other as they can explain different things because of the CSOs 
different relationship to the Swedish government and the EU.  
   
The cases were chosen from a small population as cases like these are quite rare. This is also 
part of what makes them interesting. The rarity of the cases is confirmed by the informants in 
the study. Also in the media these two cases stand out and finally proof can be found in the 
Europeanization literature where, as previously stated, domestic organizations have not been 
observed Europeanizing their activities to a large extent.  
 
Since I am not out to generalize my results but simply to broaden the perspective of 
Europeanization of domestic CSOs and deepening the understanding of what factors are 
important for the organization to Europeanize, I don’t see picking Swedish cases as 
problematic. I would however like to point out the importance of recognizing the national 
institutional context when studying Europeanization of CSOs for as research has shown that 
there is a variance both in terms of how the civil society is organized in the member states 
(Wijkström 2004:7) and how member states respond to the transferred competence to EU (i.e. 
Klüver 2010, Saurugger 2007, Beyers 2002). Several scholars point out how different national 
structures and contexts affect the ability for non-governmental actors to Europeanize but the 
theories are contested. The discussion over how different national institutional contexts can 
affect the Europeanization of CSOs will not be addressed in this thesis. Other studies have 
also dealt with different policy areas and policy phases and even though they could prove to 
be of significance I will only comment on these factors briefly and leave up to quantitative 
studies to do such comparative research.  
 
3.3 Data requirements and empirical material  
As stated by Seawright and Gerring (2008) most case-selection techniques require in-depth 
knowledge of each case. Getting access to the right sources has thus been crucial for this 
investigation. The empirical material in this study have been collected through text and 
document studies as well as through semi-structured interviews with representatives from 
CSOs and other key persons such as politicians and civil servants at both national and EU 
level.  
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3.3.1 Documentary research  
In order to present a reliable and complete narrative on the actions and argument’s 
surrounding the two cases it has been crucial to look into letters, documents, investigations, 
news articles and formal comments that have been made by different political actors in each 
case. The documented material brings complementary information to the interviews and helps 
us to better understand the quite substantial political processes surrounding the questions. The 
documents I have used consist mostly of official documents such as press releases from both 
the Swedish government and EU institutions, public letters from and to the government, the 
Commission and the organizations. Because of the actuality of the cases some media texts 
have also been used for updated information and declaration of opinions.  
3.3.2 Interviews  
The main empirical source for this study has been semi-structured interviews performed with 
a total of 18 informants in 17 interviews, of which 12 were face to face interviews and four 
were phone interviews. As much of the interviews were about clarifying the background and 
the political process in the different cases, I asked somewhat different questions to different 
informants. The CSOs were primarily asked to tell me about their work and strategies as well 
as what has been important to them in their work. The civil servants and politicians have 
primarily been asked about the significance of the CSOs actions and what contact they have 
had with the CSOs. The semi-structured interview has been performed with the help of an 
interview guide instead of specific questions (Devine 2002:198-199). This open method is a 
good way of being able to capture and develop responses in greater depth since during the 
process the interviewer can clarify and confirm already said statements.  
 
In each case the informants were chosen from a so called “snowball selection”. My first 
informant was handed to me via contacts and from there I received tips on who to contact. All 
of my interviews ended with the question if there were anyone else the informant would 
recommend me to talk to. Because of the answers received on this question I feel quite 
confident that I have reached an empirical fullness.  
 
The number of informants and who they are representing differs a little bit in the two cases. 
The explanation to this is that in the VAT case there has been cooperation and interaction 
between the more actors than in the Wolf hunt case.  
 
The Swedish carnivore association (Swedish: Svenska Rovdjursöfreningen  (SRF)) who has 
been a very active part in the wolf hunt question was requested to participate as an informant 
in the investigation but chose to decline the request. They had gladly participated when the 
question has been resolved but chose not to because of the fact that the infringement 
procedure against Sweden is an ongoing process and have not yet been settled. As SRFs 
participation in the study is desirable I believe that the other organization has provided me 
with enough information to be able to perform a comprehensive analysis of the CSOs actions 
and strategies, as well as what have been important to them in their work.  
 
Information about the CSOs can be found in the appendix 2 and 3. 
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Two informants requested to be anonymous since both cases include ongoing processes. 
Otherwise the informants have agreed to display their names.   
3.3.3 Informants  
These are the organizations, politicians and civil servants that I have interviewed. Complete 
list of interview information can be found in appendix 1.  
 
Tabel 2: Informants  
Informants VAT case - CSOs 
Name Organization Position 
Helena Carlsson Swedish Sports Confederation (RF) Sports policy advisor 
Fredrik Rhode Swedish Sports Confederation (RF) Sports policy advisor 
Mats Bernerstedt Civos Former Chairman 
Christine von Sydow Swedish Fundraising council (FRII) Director-general 
Annika Prine  Swedish Fundraising council (FRII) Vice operations manager 
Göran Pettersson Forum  Director-general 
Ariane Rodert  Forum and EESC Member of the EESC 
Informants VAT case – politicians, civil servants and EU networks 
Name Party/organization  Position 
Olle Schmidt The Liberal Party (FP) Member of European Parliament 
Kent Johansson The Center Party (C) Member of European Parliament 
Anonymous 1 ----- Assistant to Member of European 
Parliament   
Eva Posjonov The Swedish constant representation in 
Brussels (Swedish rep. in Brussels) 
Civil servant 
Maria-Elena Scoppio  European Commission (EC) Member of cabinet Tax and 
Customs Union 
Mikael Lindman Swedish government, Culture department Civil servant  
 
Informants Wolf hunt case – CSOs 
Name Organization Position 
Oscar Alarik 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 
(SNF) Lawyer  
Mikael Karlsson 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 
(SNF) and European Environmental Bureau  
Chariman of SNF and Chariman of 
EEB 
Anonymous 2 WWF Sweden ------- 
Åsa Hagelstedt Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet) Director-general  
Informant Wolf hunt case - civil servant 
Name  Institution Position 
Pierre Schelleken 
The European Commission representation in 
Sweden (the EC rep in Sweden) Director-general 
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3.4 Methodological challenges when studying 
Europeanization 
As stated in the theory chapter Europeanization is a contested matter. One of the reasons to 
why approaches to Europeanization is so contested is that Europeanization is a process, as 
with other similar concepts like globalization and internationalization we cannot distinguish a 
clear beginning and an end, it goes on as we speak. What makes it even more difficult to 
study is the fact that is not a linear process; instead actions taken at member state level as well 
as policy coming from the member states influence the European integration, create European 
ideas, values, laws etc. which in turn comes back and influence the member states in a circular 
movement (Schmidt 2002). This goes also for non-governmental actors actions. Put explicitly, 
when studying Europeanization you have to be aware and reflect upon the complex 
interdependence of the phenomenon (Saurugger 2005:292). Referring back to the debate over 
different approaches described in the theory chapter, many scholars even though recognizing 
the double nature of the concept chose to focus on either or to study the phenomenon 
empirically, which is also what I have done. This study is focusing on the effects of European 
integration on CSOs and how they need to adapt to participate in EU politics. The other side 
of the circular Europeanization process, the one where national actors can also be seen as 
agents of change in creating those policies, politics and polities that constitutes the EU 
(Radaelli 2003) I will leave for other researchers to address. While trying to approach the 
concept with a more overarching theory is desirable I believe that it is then easy to end up in 
theoretical incoherence.  
 
Despite simplifying the approach for a better and more reliable investigation we still need to 
be aware of the interdependency between the multitudes of actors that interact in European 
politics. As non-governmental actors are participating in EU-policy making and or 
implementation when studying the Europeanization of these actors one must as put by 
Saurugger (2005:292) consider both the horizontal and vertical interactions with institutional 
actors and try to distinguish between different explanatory factors in both ways.  
 
The theory that I am deriving from (Klüvers 2010) was tested in a large-N study on interest 
groups. The results of the study brought forward interesting and useful results on how 
transferred competence to EU changes the organizations behavior. To be able to capture the 
complex interdependency and to acknowledge both vertical and horizontal interaction I 
believe that studies like Klüvers must be complemented with in-depth studies like the one I 
am presenting. Ruzza and Bozzinis study is more similar to mine in the sense that it is made 
up by semi-structures interviews with both organizations and institutional actors. This study is 
also better at capturing both the horizontal and vertical interactions between organizations and 
institutions that can appear in Europeanization of CSOs.  
 
Rather than testing existing theory with closed variables where a quantitative study would be 
more suitable, my aim is to develop existing theoretical approaches to the subject of 
Europeanization of CSOs and for that an in-depth case study on only two cases serves the 
purpose well (Ragin, 1987:17,24). I used Ruzza and Bozzinis routes to broaden the picture of 
Europeanization of CSOs and when doing that I have made an attempt to, without defining 
factors in forehand, inductively search for alternative explanations.  
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This in-depth study I believe shows us the need, as stated by (Saurugger 2005:292) to 
understand the interdependency among several actors. Trying to create an overall inclusive 
theoretical approach to this subject is very hard and I think that is one of the main points that 
my cases will show. I believe it is fruitful to try to map out factors that can explain 
organizations behavior but I still believe one must be very careful with making any 
generalizations. I therefore suggest when looking at the results of this investigation that you 
will see them as useful material in order to better understand the complexity of 
Europeanization of non-governmental actors and not as a new theoretical framework that 
claims representativeness.  
3.5 How the analyze was performed   
In the upcoming chapter I have presented chronological narratives over the political process 
taking place in each case. The actions taken by the CSOs are analyzed simultaneously as the 
story goes along, relating the events back to Klüvers as well as Ruzza and Bozzinis theories. 
In relation to the empirical material the theory’s precision in different sequences of the 
process have been discussed and complemented where there were gaps that needed to be 
filled. At the end of each narrative I have summarized the strategies taken by the CSOs in 
each case and why they chose that strategy. After the two narratives are presented one by one 
I will bring the cases together and end up in a summarized discussion and final remarks of the 
study. As I stated earlier this study is not out to present a new theoretical framework but 
rather to discuss aspects of existing theory and complement it. Again I would like to point out 
that the case studies differ in length because of the less complex procedure in the Wolf hunt 
case. 
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4 Analysis 
4.1   The VAT case 
4.1.1 Swedish non-compliance with the VAT directive 
Already when Sweden joined the EU in 1995, there was an EU directive in place that 
regulated Value Added Tax (VAT). Today it is the Common system on Value added Tax 
(2006/112/EG) (the VAT directive) that regulates VAT in the EU. Before describing further 
the background to this case I would already at this point like to make clear that the CSOs 
engagement in this question will come to include two policy phases, one implementation 
phase and one policy creating phase. The organizations both try to avoid an infringement 
procedure as well as working to affect a renewed directive on VAT. Another important 
clarification that needs to be brought up from the beginning is the fact that the VAT directive 
is containing many different areas related to VAT. I will continue to speak of the VAT 
directive even though I am only referring to a small part of the directive, namely article 132 
(9) and the question of exemptions from VAT.  
 
Since Sweden entered the EU, two public inquiries have been carried out (SOU 1994:88 and 
SOU 2002:74), stating that the Swedish VAT law (Mervärdeslagen, 1994:200) does not 
conform to EU law and that changes are needed in Swedish legislation. The conclusions from 
these inquiries have however been ignored by Swedish governments so that the exemptions 
from VAT for non-profit organizations that this case is all about, still exist in Swedish law 
today. The exemptions were implemented in Swedish law in 1968 to decrease the 
administrative burden for non-profit organizations (Ds 2009:58:80).  
 
In 2008 the Commission addressed Sweden with a formal notice where it is stated that 
Sweden is not following the VAT directive and more specifically article 132 (9) and the 
question of exemptions from VAT (europa.eu 2008). The so-called “formal notice” from the 
Commission counts as a proceeding to what can become an infringement procedure. The 
infringement procedure is laid out in Art 226 of the EC Treaty and regulates how the 
Commission should proceed with suspected member states non-compliance with community 
law. If the Commission suspects an infringement, they hand the member state a formal notice 
where the member state is asked to submit observations. If the member state do not meet the 
Commission’s demands, the Commission continues with a “Reasoned opinion” that can be 
seen as the first official step in an infringement procedure. The Commission then sets up legal 
justifications for commencing legal proceedings and gives the member state a one-month time 
limit to respond. The next step is a referral to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and this is 
where the Commission tries to find a last minute solution before going to court. If this does 
not work out either the case will be taken to court and the ECJ gives a final judgment and 
possiblyy hand out fines if the verdict goes against the member state (Article 226 EC). An 
infringement procedure has not yet been raised against Sweden in this case.     
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As stated above, Sweden’s non-compliance to EU law was acknowledged by the Commission 
in 2008 and the issue became a political question. Just as Klüver describes it, it put pressure 
on both the national government and concerned CSOs in Sweden to acknowledge EU policy 
and institutions.  
 
Without going further into what exactly the Swedish law is not complying with we can 
conclude that Sweden is thought to have a too narrow definition of the term “taxable person”. 
The result of this, the Commission states would be that too many organizations are exempted 
from paying VAT. This would in turn lead to distortion of competition and hinder Sweden to 
contribute to the EU’s joint resources (europe.eu 2008). What else is problematic is that the 
VAT directive accepts exemptions from VAT, but only for certain kinds of transactions and 
not for, as in Sweden, an entire group of organizations (Ds 2009:58:84-85). In many other 
member state the use of a turnover limit to decide on who is exempted from VAT or not 
functions as a solution to remove smaller organizations from VAT (Ds 2009:58:88-89). The 
Swedish organizations do not however see this as a satisfying solution, for several reasons.  
A turnover limit is thought to increase the administrative burden anyway since organizations 
close to the limit would have to keep track of their incomes, tax agency would be overloaded 
with inadequate bookkeeping etc. The CSOs also claim the specialty of the Swedish civil 
society that is organized differently and therefore are more sensitive to regulations like this. 
The organizations are primarily afraid that increased financial costs and an increased 
administrative burden will threaten the existence of many Swedish CSOs. Non-profit 
organizations in Sweden often rely on voluntary work and with an increased burden on the 
administrative staff, CSOs are afraid that it will become harder and/or more expensive to 
recruit the professional help that would be needed. 
4.1.2 Information sharing between the government and the 
Commission 
When the formal notice to Sweden had been delivered, an extensive process of information 
sharing and exchange of letters was initiated. The Swedish government responded that they 
do not fully share the statement by the Commission but that they have agreed to look over the 
compatibility with EU law. Another public inquiry was initiated to further examine the 
Swedish legislation and its relation to the VAT directive (The Swedish Treasury 2008).  
  
Grufberg and Hamberg, the authors of the 2009 inquiry, couldn’t give any clear description of 
how new regulations would affect non-profit organizations financially. It is stated that the 
affects would vary a lot between different organizations (Ds 2009:58:232). The investigation 
also stated that other member states had adapted their legislation to the directive and that 
Sweden too should change its legislation (Ds 2009:58:82). The investigation also brings 
forward the possibility for national governments to put a maximum limit on turnover that 
exempts all organizations below that limit from VAT, which the VAT directive allows for (Ds 
2009:58:190). The suggested limit was set to 250 000 Swedish crowns. But the 
recommendation was still to change the legislation so that also non-profit organizations 
should be included in the term “taxable person”.  
 
It is at this point that the organizations start to recognize the need to get involved in the 
question in other ways than just to be a part of public inquires or governmental hearings.  
  24 
4.1.3 CSOs get engaged at the national level 
In 2009, when the public inquiry on VAT had been released, The Swedish Sports 
Confederation (RF) went public in a press conference where the VAT question was brought 
up and presented it as a big threat to Swedish sports. RF noticed a great concern among their 
grassroots and therefore decided to go forward with the VAT question and start other 
lobbying activities (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). RF asked organizations to 
estimate what the removal of exemptions would mean to them, started to engaged their 21 
districts, asking them to contact local organizations, politicians and local media, they started a 
Facebook group etc. (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).  RF states that working with 
the districts was fruitful and when the question was brought up in an interpellation in the 
Swedish Parliament, politicians from every party brought forward their concerns to the 
responsible minister, Finance Minister Anders Borg. Everyone seemed to agree that this 
question must be handled so that no disadvantages would come to Swedish civil society sector 
(Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).  
 
From the statement by Bernerstedt, former chairman of Civil society organizations in 
partnership (Civos), we see that the VAT question was actually one of the reasons to why the 
organization was founded in the first place. 
 
The start of the organization was preceded with a process regarding whether an organization like this is need or 
not. Civil society is so differentiated that it is difficult to represent the whole and have a common agenda. Not 
one voice, but then the VAT issue appeared […] The VAT question was one of the first questions that we started 
working on. It was pretty easy to get along in the desire to preserve the current VAT exemptions as generous as 
it is today, and to avoid changes (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview). 
 
Civos started cooperating with the Swedish Fundraising Council (FRII). They collaborated 
financially to hire experts who could write documentation on the consequences for non-profit 
organizations if the law would change (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview). Göran 
Pettersson, Director-general at the organization Forum, sat in the working committee of Civos 
at that time and thus worked together with FRII as well. Pettersson states that it is at this point 
that the organizations start to differ a little bit in their work.  
 
The organizations realize more and more the significance of the question, but they were still 
not acting towards the EU institutions. The CSOs tried to affect the question by working 
nationally by engaging their grassroots to try to convince Swedish politicians the importance 
of this issue. As described by Ruzza and Bozzini all of the organizations initially took the 
National route to influence the question.  
 
What the Finance Minister then did was to suggest a turnover threshold to the Commission, 
which was one of the suggestions in the inquiry from 2009. He submitted a request for a limit 
on one million crowns to the Commission, which is higher than the limit presented in the 
latest inquiry, but lower than most organizations had wished for. Rodhe says that “by doing 
this Borg however successfully killed the opposition and it did not become a question in the 
2010 election (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). The National Route was partly 
successful but the CSOs did not get exactly what they wanted.   
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4.1.1 Doors are opened towards the EU  
On the 1
st
 of December 2010, the Commission announced a Green Paper on a new directive 
on VAT, which will replace the old directive when it is finished. The Green Paper was open 
until the end of May 2011, and was supposed to gather comments from whoever concerned 
with the subject. With this initiative, a formal opportunity emerged for the organizations to 
get the Commission to understand their cause. Two parallel processes were thus in action; one 
concerning the infringement procedure, where the commission had been handling a proposal 
on turn over limit from the Swedish government, and one related to the creation of a new 
directive on VAT.  
 
Pettersson at Forum brought forward the question whether the organizations were working in 
the best way. Wouldn’t it be smarter to work politically to change the conditions? It showed 
that this was the strategy RF had. Forum and RF agreed that they should start working 
together (Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview).  
 
Because of the Green Paper, RF decides to send a representative down to Brussels to monitor 
the VAT question, but also to build competence on lobbying strategies in Brussels for the 
future (Rodhe & Carlsson 2012, interview). RF had sent representatives to Brussels before, 
but now they saw a good chance to send someone there for a longer period of time, to both 
monitor the VAT question, but also to learn and build structures for EU related work in the 
future. RF had started to recognize that being in Brussels matters and especially now when 
there is an EU White Paper on sports (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). The 
transferring of competence to EU makes RF want to establish networks and competences at 
EU level, so far Klüver’s theory fits well with RF’s actions.  
 
Bernerstedt further states that many private interest groups have recognized the importance of 
working in Brussels before, but now civil society has also recognized that. “Even if civil 
society is big in Sweden, we live in a larger legal context and we need to adapt to it” 
(Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview). Civos therefore decided to act through those of their 
members who had European contacts, especially through Forum, which then came to include 
also RF since RF and Forum cooperated.  
 
The recognition that it is important to influence Brussels can be referred to Klüvers theory on 
adaptional pressure. Second of all the strategy to start to work in Brussels indicates the 
European route up described by Ruzza and Bozzini but with the modification that it is 
domestic organizations and not EU based CSOs who go there. We see that under the right 
conditions even domestic CSOs chose to lobby towards EU institutions directly. 
 
Through the Green Paper, the EU invited organizations to comment on the future of the VAT 
directive, which could be seen as a formal opportunity for CSOs to get engaged. The 
European route up that the organizations now seem to be taking does not fully correspond to 
Klüver’s compensation hypothesis, as the organizations despite good recognition for their 
cause at the national level, still choose to go to the EU. The organizations will to Europeanize 
seem to be a relevant factor as well.  
 
When it comes to FRII’s engagement in the question it looks somewhat different. To von 
Sydow at FRII it seemed clear that the Commission is going to harmonize this question and 
not allow exemptions, and that it is rather important for the organizations to try to lobby for 
compensations for those organizations that would be affected (von Sydow & Prine, FRII 
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2012, interview). FRII has a more pragmatic view on the question due to the fact that their 
member organizations are not as threatened as sports organizations, or other smaller 
organizations, because they already have administrative competences and a change wouldn’t 
be as damaging to them (von Sydow & Prine FRII 2012, interview). As Civos, Forum and RF 
started to get engaged at the European level, FRII chose a different strategy.  
 
FRII has not lobbied at the national level during the recent year, but they have instead aimed 
their work at the Commission and the new directive (von Sydow & Prine, FRII 2012, 
interview). FRII is represented in a European network called ECCVAT (European Charities’ 
Committee on VAT). Through ECCVAT, FRII is trying to display the question as a European 
issue to get more weight behind their work, at the same time as they admit that it is hard when 
the solutions are different in different countries (von Sydow & Prine FRII 2012, interview). 
 
FRII’s engagement in ECCVAT could be seen as taking the European route up via an EU 
network. Klüver (2010) described how EU-networks often only get engaged in questions that 
are common for a large majority of their members and that are very internationally related. 
This seems to be the case also when it comes to ECCVAT. There does not seem to be a great 
influence or engagement from ECCVAT in solving the Swedish issue on exemptions from 
VAT, but instead a focus on influencing the new directive. 
4.1.2 European Route up forces cooperation among CSOs  
When the organizations decide to take the European route up and start lobbying towards EU 
institutions, the question of resources becomes important. RF is a financially strong 
organization and thus has the capacity to finance EU work. RF also is representing a very 
large percentage of the Swedish population. Representativeness is therefore also covered, 
which are exactly those resources Klüver describes as important to explain why organizations 
goes to Brussels or not. The question here is how successful RF could be without 
collaborating with other organizations and without establishing a political ally in the Swedish 
government, as well as how smaller organizations than RF could also follow along on the 
European route up.    
 
Pettersson explains that RF favored from uniting with Forum because sports is not so big in 
the European context and that’s why it was good for RF to unite with Forum that is active in 
social work, which is a much bigger area in the EU. What Forum gained from RF was that RF 
is a large organization with big resources. They are also on their own ministry and have good 
contacts with the Finance Ministry in Sweden, which is useful for Forum that are not as big 
on the national level (Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview). Furthermore, Forum has the 
advantage of knowing their way around in Brussels by having a representative present. Ariane 
Rodert is representing Forum and another Swedish CSO, Famna, in the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC). By working from the inside of EESC, Rodert can easier get 
access to meetings, people, and documents than a lobbyist who comes from the outside 
(Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).  
 
We see here that the organizations have turned their attention to the EU and when doing so 
also see the need to try to adopt both strategies to be able to handle another political arena 
than the national one. We reckon that the organizations act strategically and that resources can 
be switched among each other. Resources, as put by Klüver, therefore need to be refined and 
put in context.   
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4.1.1 Working the National Route 
Even though the organizations had now turned their interest towards the EU institutions, they 
continue their work at the national level, and a coincidence gave them some help on the way.   
On the 25
th
 of March, 2011, the request from the Swedish government is turned down in a 
response by the Commission that only allowed for a 250 000 crown turn over limit.  
 
The rejection in March put liquid on the fire. This meant that in the middle of the Green Paper process the 
question became very acknowledged and relevant all of a sudden. It upset both the Finance Minister and the 
grassroots organizations (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). 
 
On the 31
st
 of March 2011, the Swedish Finance Minister gathers Swedish CSOs to inform 
them that he will continue to fight against the Commission on this issue and will not allow 
changes in the Swedish legislation that would damage CSOs in Sweden (regeringen.se 2011). 
The question then goes back to scratch and now an informal alliance between the national 
government and the CSOs start to take shape, and actions are taken at all political levels 
simultaneously.  
 
When the Commission ignored the response, Borg had the feeling that he had civil society behind his back. He 
said in a statement that he is dependent on that the local commitment is shown towards the Commission and that 
he needs civil society to be able to pursue the issue. You can see it as collaboration between civil society and the 
government to resist EU policy now that we have similar views (Bernested Civos 2012, interview). 
 
At the national level the CSOs ran campaigns with the purpose of engaging grassroots to 
submit responses to the Green Paper, but also to put pressure on the national government to 
solve the question for them and not give in to pressure from the Commission. Through these 
campaigns the organizations were able to get many Swedish organizations to submit answers 
to the Green Paper. Out of the 1700 remittances that were handed in to the Green Paper on the 
future of VAT, 968 came from Sweden and most of them from Swedish athlete-organizations 
(European Commission 2011). Bernerstedt states that he understood retrospectively that these 
campaigns were important because they made EU became more aware that this is seen as a 
big issue in Sweden and that it is not only big organizations who think that, but locally rooted 
organizations as well (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview).  
 
The organizations worked on the National route making sure that they keep the strong 
opinion that has been formed around the issues and that the Finance Minister doesn’t give in 
to the Commission’s demands. A representative at the Swedish representation in Brussels puts 
admits that the government was also affected by the mobilization (Posjonov, Swedish Rep in 
Brussels, 2012, interview). This issue was not particularly controversial at the Swedish level, 
everyone seemed to agree that Sweden is better off keeping the present rules. The 
organizations however wanted to assure that the politicians had to stick to their promises. As 
stated by Ruzza and Bozzini, the National route is often used when organizations see that the 
national government can have influence in the question. The organizations seem to think that 
the Finance Minister really could have influence in this question, but at the same time they 
realize that the question is just a small piece in the political game and that the VAT question 
can be traded as political goods for other bigger questions. If that would happen, Pettersson 
states that it would cost Borg a “substantial political price, for the media would jump on it” 
(Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview). 
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In May, in a new interpellation debate, the Finance Minister even stated that he would be 
prepared to block a new VAT Directive by putting in his veto, unless the issue wasn’t 
resolved. “Now he cannot back down, but on the other hand the Commission has also painted 
itself in the corner” (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF 2012, interview). Even if Sweden would not get 
the matter trough in the Commission, the organizations have seen to it that it has become very 
hard for the Swedish Finance Minister to change his mind.  
 
4.1.2 Working the European Route up 
Simultaneously as work is being done in Sweden, RF and Forum are working the European 
route up. The lobbying work in Brussels can basically be divided in two. The more formal 
work like arranging round tables, talking to Members of Parliament and trying to get 
international recognition for the cause was performed by Helena Carlsson from RF, while the 
more informal work which included extracting information about the process in the 
Commission and knowing when and where to act, was handled by Ariane Rodert, 
representing Forum in the EESC.  
 
Carlsson explains that lobbying towards the EU institutions was easier than she thought. 
Carlsson states “it is impossible for the employees in EU to keep track of everything, which 
makes it quite easy to get access to the institutions” (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). 
This is true both when it comes to the Commission and the Parliament and she believed it was 
quite easy to get in contact with representatives from both institutions. Carlsson however 
describes that working towards the Parliament was easier because the parliamentarians are 
elected and thus more interested to meet with the public. Also when it comes to influence the 
politicians are much easier to convince, she states (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). 
 
I believe it is important to bring forward this discrepancy between the EU institutions. To get 
access to the Parliament was seen as less difficult. The Parliament is supposed to function as 
the European citizens’ representatives and therefore needs to be more open towards the 
public. Since the Parliament is co decisive in some issues and in others a consultative body, 
they can also influence the two other EU institutions; the Commission and the Council. 
Taking the European route up could therefore be about going to the Parliament to indirectly 
influence the other institutions. I conclude that when anticipating the engagement of CSOs in 
Europeanized activities, one must separate between EU institutions.  
 
While getting access to the institutions was easier than the CSOs thought, the national 
characteristics of the question made it hard to get recognition from other CSOs and political 
actors in other countries. Both Carlsson and Rodert brought up the question in their respective 
EU networks but without getting any bigger recognition. According to Posjnov at the Swedish 
representation in Brussels, it could be a matter of other countries having the same issue but 
not wanting to gain the attention from the Commission, because they are afraid that they 
would be initiated with an infringement procedure (Posjnov, Swedish Rep in Brussels, 2012, 
interview).  
 
Along Carlsson’s work in Brussels, Ariane Rodert, representing Forum and another 
organization Famna in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) tried to use her 
position to contribute to the matter. EESC is a consultative body of the EU that is supposed to 
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function as a bridge between the EU and the organized civil society (eesc.eu 2012). Rodert 
describes how her efforts were about open doors to the Commission and the Swedish 
representation in Brussels (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, Interview). 
 
Rodert describes the initial meeting she had with the Commission as very pessimistic. “They 
had the impression that nothing could be done about this. But they asked for statistics and 
information from RF and the question still remains” (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, 
Interview). After this meeting Rodert contacted the Swedish representation in Brussels. 
Rodert describes it as if there was one picture presented on the outside and another one from 
the inside, where the inside picture offered a bit more optimistic view (Rodert, Forum and 
EESC, 2012, Interview). 
 
The contact at the Swedish representation was an important one – he gave us tips on when we should act and 
when we should lie low. I got the times and dates of when the issues was discussed in the Council, so that we 
could time our efforts (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, Interview). 
 
At one point Rodert asked the contact at the Swedish representation how the organizations 
should proceed and the contact thought it would be good at that point to not push too much 
but instead send letters to the Commissioner. Then Forum wrote a letter, passed it on to Civos 
who wrote a similar letter, then FRII wrote a letter and then RF wrote and then it showed up 
letters from five influential Swedish organizations to the Commission at once (Pettersson, 
Forum 2012, interview). Pettersson describes why these contacts were crucial. 
 
You could say that it is a kind of a backdoor lobbying. We have no resources compared to any other major 
player who can add millions of crowns on trying to make an impact within the EU. We try to use the trust and 
the contacts we have and they have been crucial in this case (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview). 
 
Pettersson also mentions the importance of having good contacts with the Chairman and the 
Chief of Cabinet of the EESC, that are both Swedes (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview).  
The organization could make use of the political knowledge that already exists among 
Swedish representatives in Brussels. Pettersson also states that they know a lot themselves, 
but that they don’t know half as much as what those who have been working in Brussels for a 
long time knows (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview).  
 
Refering to Klüver’s resources, these statements describes the fact that even smaller 
organizations can, by uniting with representatives from the national government in a question 
like this, get crucial information and thereby perform a better work than they would have been 
able to do on their own. By shaping alliances with representatives of the Swedish government, 
the organizations all of a sudden get access to much more information and knowledge than 
would have ever been possible to reach otherwise. The organizations do not only unite among 
each other to cover for lack of resources, but also unite with the Swedish government. Not 
focusing solely on the vertical interactions, but also seeing the horizontal interactions between 
the CSOs and the government, gives us a clearer view on what possibilities the CSOs have in 
Europeanizing their activities in a successful way. 
 
I also believe it is relevant to speak of key persons within the EU context that have either EU 
competence and/or political power. This resembles Klüver’s description of resources in terms 
of financial, personnel, and representation.  Unlike a quantitative study, a qualitative study 
can recognize also single key persons that can compensate for lack of resources.  
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4.1.3 Results of working with the Parliament and the Green Paper 
As I described the organization was successful in engaging their grassroots. However, when 
the Green Paper was closed on the 31
st 
of May in 2011 the Commission stated that the 
responses coming from mostly Swedish sports organizations discussing exemptions from 
VAT for non-profit organizations were “the result of a misunderstanding” and that the 
responses were reacting against the existing directive from 2006 and not to the Green Paper 
that was about the future of VAT (European Commission 2010). The Commission therefore 
stated that these responses would be left unattended in the process of finishing a proposal for 
the new directive on the future of VAT (European Commission 2010). Rodhe explains that it 
was not at all a misunderstanding from the Swedish organizations’ side. This was an aimed 
action towards the new directive where the organizations requested a change in the new 
legislation (Rodhe & Carlsson RF 2012, interview). Even though the Commission rejected the 
answers, they did bring it up in the summary which makes it clear that the Commission has at 
least recognized the large interest in the questions from Swedish organizations (Rodhe RF 
2012, interview).  
 
The organizations and particularly RF chose to work towards the Parliament. The 
Parliamentarians think that RF and the rest of the CSOs have done a good job in analyzing the 
question and package it in a way that works in Brussels (Johansson, EP, 2012, interview; 
Schmidt, EP, 2012, interview) The parliamentarians state that they have been in much contact 
with RF and that they themselves are also a part of civil society. Johansson describes the 
importance of the organization’s engagement: 
 
Yes it is crucial, because it does not work so that if you are interested in raising a question you could just send a 
press release to some Swedish magazines and then it is done. No, you have to analyze it, judge it from different 
perspectives, apply it to the correct paragraphs in the law, etc. and that has been done in this case. The 
organizations have done a god job in my opinion (Johansson, EP, 2012, interview). 
 
Regarding the question whether what would have happened if the organizations wouldn’t 
have acted on this matter, Mikael Lindman at the Swedish Culture Department said that it is 
hard to answer, but that the government have nevertheless benefited greatly from the 
contribution from civil society (Lindman, Swedish Culture Department, 2012, phone-
interview). 
 
The work on the parliamentarians thus proved to be successful, not only in theory, but in 
practice. In October 2011 the European Parliament voted for the possibilities for member 
states to be able to decide for themselves whether to exempt non-profit organizations from 
VAT or not (European Parliament 2011). However, the Parliaments statement in this question 
is only to be considered as guidance for the Commission in their decision-making and the 
Commission chose to ignore also the statements from the Parliament.  
  
4.1.4  Results of working towards the Commission and the Council 
When it comes to strategies Rodert says that according to her it was better to focus on 
working with the Council and the Commission, and to try to teach them how important the 
question is to Swedish civil society (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, interview). The informal 
work towards the Commission and the Council is of course much harder to evaluate since the 
question has not been resolved and there are no clear answers to what will happen next. What 
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is clear from talking to a representative from the Commission is that the Commission is very 
well aware of how concerned Swedish organizations are about this question. Maria-Elena 
Scoppio at the Commission states that they have really tried to be flexible in this question and 
that she hopes that the Swedish organizations understand their point a view. She further states 
that it is extremely exceptional that the Commission has worked this hard to get to a solution 
that fits both sides (Scoppio, EC, 2012, interview).  
 
Throughout the interview Scoppio stresses that the Commission has tried to cooperate on this 
issue and that they have been extraordinarily flexible and blocked the infringement procedure 
to find a solution. At the same time they cannot ignore an infringement procedure, she states.  
 
It is impossible to say what will finally resolve the question but as the situation stands, it is 
important to note that the Commission has not proceeded with the infringement process 
against Sweden. There could be three possible explanations to this. Either the Commission is 
going to proceed with the infringement process and just hasn’t done it yet, or they will drop 
the infringement process and thereby accept the Swedish claims to keep its existing 
legislation, or finally the Commission might wait to proceed with the infringement process 
until the new directive is in place (Rhode & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).  
 
What could be relevant in the end is that the question seems ultimately to be about politics 
and not jurisprudence. If the Commission would bring Sweden to court and Sweden would be 
sentenced, it is still up to the government to decide how to act on the matter. The laws made 
up in the EU are only as relevant and correct as the member states choose to implement them. 
Therefore the hard work done by the national organizations to get recognition for their cause 
at the national level might as well be what determines the question in the end, even if the 
matter goes to court and Sweden is convicted. 
 
4.1.5 Summary of strategies used by CSOs in the VAT case  
 
To summarize, in order to achieve results in an EU related question the following strategies 
were used by the CSOs in the VAT case:  
 
 Some of the organizations joined forces with other CSOs to share resources. 
 All of the organizations took the National route working to convince the Swedish government 
to act on their behalf towards the EU. Some of the organizations also used the Swedish 
government as an ally who could share EU competence and knowledge, so that the CSOs 
could lobby more effectively.   
 Some of the organizations took the European route up towards the Commission and the 
Council directly, working with lobbying activities to get recognition for their cause. 
 All of the organizations took the European route up by engaging grassroots to sign the Green 
Paper on the new VAT directive.  
 Some of the organizations European route up towards the European Parliament, working to 
convince the Parliament to consult the Commission according to the CSOs wishes. 
 One organization took the European route up via an EU network , leaving the lobby work 
towards the new directive much up to them because of lack of resources.   
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4.2 The Wolf hunt case  
4.2.1 Licensed hunt on wolfs in Sweden  
In 2007 an inquiry on the conservation of Swedish predators was carried out. The inquiry led 
to a proposition that the Swedish Parliament voted for in October 2009 “en ny 
rovdjursförvaltning” (prop. 2008/09:210). The numbers in the chamber were 149 for and 107 
against, 33 turned down their votes. The proposal states that the wolf population should, in the 
meanwhile, at least be decreased to a number of 210 individual wolfs with the help of 
licensed hunt and complimentary protective hunt in cases of wolf causing damage. These 
actions should contribute to rejuvenating the wolf population and the killed wolfs should be 
replaced with planted wolfs from outside of Sweden (prop. 2008/09:210). The goal was set to 
keep the number of wolfs to 210 individuals during a period of five years and to then evaluate 
the rejuvenation. Based on the national legislation, as well as the Habitats directive, articles 
12 and 16, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket), which is the 
Swedish government’s agency responsible for proposing and implementing environmental 
policies, approved on January 2 2010, a licensed hunt of 27 wolves. The hunt ended in 
February 2010, by then 28 wolves had been killed.  
 
Prior to this licensed hunt, the debate had been going on for some time regarding the 
proposition on a new conservation policy for predators. Conservation organizations were part 
of the inquiry and tried to affect the question, which they thought was going against the 
Habitats directive. The organizations experienced no recognition from the government and 
saw very little possibilities to influence and change the government’s attitude on the question. 
The question on wolfs in Sweden is very much contested and has become one of the most 
infected debates in Swedish politics in recent times. The question has engaged large parts of 
Swedish civil society, where it is mainly the hunter organizations and also for example 
Saamis standing on the government’s side in favor of licensed hunt on wolfs, and the 
conservation groups standing on the other side being against the hunt.  
 
The conservation organizations addressed in this investigation state that they had been trying 
to influence the question at the national level by being part of the inquiry, having meetings 
with politicians, acting in different forums where the wolfs are discussed, but the 
organizations didn’t get anything through in this question. The organization worked the 
Traditional route at this point. This is where the EU is apparent only in terms of EU 
legislation, which the organizations pointed out, but got no recognition for. So far no attempts 
at engaging in EU lobbying activities had been performed.  
 
Neither was there a possibility for Swedish conservation organizations to appeal on this 
question in Swedish courts, says Oscar Alarik, lawyer at Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SNF). Mikael Karlsson, Chairman of SNF states in a newspaper that they were 
ashamed that Sweden that has been a role model in this question is now killing animals from 
one of the most endangered species in Sweden (dn.se 2010). This is how the situation was laid 
out when four Swedish CSOs decided to bring the question outside of Sweden.  
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4.2.2 Final way out – EU becomes a possibility for CSOs 
Once the licensed hunt had been approved, four Swedish conservation organizations: Swedish 
Society for Nature Conservation (SNF), The Swedish Carnivore Association (SRF), World 
Wildlife Foundation Sweden (WWF) and Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet), asked 
themselves if there was a way to use the law to hinder additional hunts on wolfs. According to 
the species protecting regulation, one must protect endangered animals whereas wolfs are 
counted as such an endangered species. Alarik at SNF, tells us that the species regulation that 
could have given the organizations a possibility to bring the government to court and accused 
them for breaking the law, is disconnected by the hunting legislation (Alarik SNF, 2012 
interview). Alarik further argues that Sweden has signed international conventions that 
environmental organizations should have the right to appeal in the case of serious cases of 
breach of law. However, the rule is not introduced into Swedish law, so there were no ways 
for the conservation organizations like SNF to pursue the matter in Swedish courts. Because 
of the political stalemate and the impossibility to pursue the matter in Swedish courts, the four 
Swedish conservation organizations mentioned above decided to gather forces and discuss an 
alternative plan where they would instead try to get the EU involved to change the national 
policy.  
 
Since the EU has legislative competence in this area and the Swedish predator legislation is 
highly regulated by the Habitats directive, the organizations now had an opportunity to bring 
the question outside of the national political arena and into another playing field where other 
rules determine the game. It should however be stated that all the organizations would have 
preferred to resolve the question at national level, had there been a possibility to turn to 
national courts, but there was simply no alternative than to move the question outside of 
Sweden. “We were obliged to pursue this through the EU, with all that comes with that. We 
are not used to do this and we would much rather resolve this question at a national level” 
(Alarik, SNF, 2012 interview).  
 
Then how can the organizations make use of the fact that the EU holds the competence? One 
way to settle the question is to let the European court of Justice (ECJ) determine the issue and 
decide whether Sweden is breaking the law or not. However, the organizations themselves 
cannot take the matter to the ECJ, since private persons or organizations are not allowed to do 
so. Instead the way forward in situations like this is to convince the Commission that the 
matter needs to be reviewed by the European court and then it is the Commission that takes 
the matter to the ECJ, if they see the need of it. Before the Commission takes the matter to 
court there is a long process of trying to reach an agreement with the concerned member state 
(Alarik, SNF, 2012, interview).  
 
By Europeanizing their activities the organizations could use EU policy and institutions to 
achieve policy change at the national level. Taking the European route down means here that 
the organizations can try to shape an alliance with the European Commission, which could 
dramatically change the preconditions for the outcome of the question.  
.  
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4.2.3 A written complaint - the question is brought outside of Sweden  
The organizations decided to take the question to the Commission, even though none of the 
organizations had done something like this before, at least not in this way (Alarik SNF, 2012 
interview). Åsa Hagelsted, Director-general at Djurskyddet describes how they had tried the 
usual lobbying activities without success, but now they could jointly make use of the EU. 
Hagelstedt says, that at least for Djurskyddet, it is often the other way around “that we are 
trying to back up the Swedish government when they go down to the EU, since our animal 
welfare policies are much better than the EU’s, but you use what you can” (Hagelstedt, 
Djurskyddet, 2012, interview). 
 
The organizations contacted the Commission for some questions and went down to Brussels 
for a meeting to discuss the possible complaint with the Commission. It stood quite clear from 
the beginning that the Commission thought this was a serious matter and that they were very 
puzzled about Sweden doing something like this, when they had the picture of Sweden being 
a success country when it comes to environmental issues. After the meeting the organizations 
started to compile material for the notification, which Alarik described as “only the first step 
in a long chain of correspondence between the parts” (Alarik, SNF, 2012 interview). The 
complaint was submitted to the Commission in March 2010 with the wish of stopping 
licensed hunt on wolfs in Sweden (CSOs: 1, 2010). According to the four organizations, the 
Swedish wolfs have an unfavorable conservation status, mostly because of inbreeding due to 
geographic isolation, which should make licensed hunt of this species illegal according to the 
Habitats directive. The organizations also pointed at some other facts that they thought were 
problematic, for example that the hunt itself was handled very poorly (CSOs: 1, 2010). 
 
By taking the European route down and address the Commission with such a complaint, the 
organizations engaged EU institutions in national policy matters with the hope of getting 
more political, or ultimately juridical power behind their cause.  
 
Before a formal infringement process starts it is praxis that the Commission raises questions 
to the concerned member state, giving them an opportunity to respond before any formal 
actions are taken. The first formal notice from the Commission arrived in June 2010, where 
the Commission asked questions to Sweden, according to regular procedure. This case was 
part of a pilot project where the Commission tried out a more formalized preprocessing where 
there is a standardized correspondence with a member state that has received a formal notice 
by the Commission (ec.europa.eu infringements/EU pilot, 2012). There are quite a few 
different rounds of information sharing that are then being evaluated by the Commission and 
then it is a preprocessing before the actual treaty-driven process (Alarik SNF, 2012, 
interview). 
 
4.2.4 CSOs and the Swedish government battle over recognition from 
the Commission 
 
During the coming month the government tried to convince the Commission that no laws had 
been broken and that the hunt is perfectly legitimate together with other conservation actions, 
such as planting of new wolfs, etc. (i.e. Blücher (2010). I asked the organizations if they 
thought it would have been possible to just report the matter to the Commission and leave it to 
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them. The answer from all of the organizations was no, rather a quite extensive effort by the 
organizations has been needed to achieve results. Alarik at SNF explains that there are 
historical examples of complaints from private persons that have ended up in court, but this 
question is very knowledge intensive and they are dealing with very sophisticated 
argumentation that the Commission needs to be supplied with in order to know what is 
happening and what they should do about it. Alarik further states that the government has 
tried to come up with dozens of different arguments as to why the hunt is legitimate, but the 
organizations have been able to reject all of them. One example of the government’s attempt 
at convincing the Commission, when the organizations countered and was able to put down 
the governments argumentation, was when the government tried to point at the fact that the 
number of wolfs that were about to be shot were so low that it would be below the exemptions 
in the directive. The organizations countered by saying that 10–15 percent of a whole 
population is not a small amount. The organizations could also point at earlier juridical cases 
were just a few percentage of, in that case a bird species, was seen as a significant amount. 
The government then tried to say that one cannot compare wolfs to birds and the 
organizations responded that these birds actually live longer than wolfs and it is therefore 
even more important to not shoot this amount of wolfs. The organizations won the 
argumentation. “There was a wide range of such arguments, which we, with the help of 
researchers, facts and official statistics, often quite simply could manage to falsify” (Alarik 
SNF, 2012, interview). 
 
The organizations submitted their own argumentation to the Commission, but also analyzed 
and commented on the government’s argumentation (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview) Alarik 
further explains the importance of providing this material, since the Commission has no 
opportunity to collect the information themselves (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview). An active 
complaining part seems to be important in this case.  
 
Pierre Schelleken, Director-general at the European Commission representation in Sweden, 
explains that about half the infringement procedures that are raised against the EU are 
initiated by the Commission itself, and half of them spring from complaints from 
organizations like the ones in this case. “It is possible that we wouldn’t have done anything if 
we wouldn’t have acknowledged this issue in Sweden on our own” (Schelleken, the EC rep. 
in Sweden, 2012, phone-interview). Schelleken further states that the Commission needs 
information in order to decide if EU law has been broken. “It is common that we also meet 
with both the complaining part and the government which is subject to the complaint. The 
counter organizations have also visited the Commission in Brussels” (Schelleken, the 
Commissions representation in Sweden, 2012, phone-interview).  
 
These statements exemplify the need of the Commission to engage CSOs in their work when 
acting as guardians of the Treatises. The Commission use organizations to provide them with 
information and expertise, just as Klüver discusses. When CSOs have the right knowledge 
that the Commission needs, they are also allowed access to that institution. As in the VAT 
case where the CSOs could exchange goods with the government, we here see how the CSOs 
exchange goods with the Commission.  
 
The organizations europeanized the question by explaining to the Commission that a 
favorable conservation status for wolfs should be decided in the EU, since it’s also of 
importance to potential upcoming cases (Anonymous 2, WWF, 2012, interview). As in the 
VAT question it seems important for the organizations to adapt their message and to present it 
in a way that functions in the EU context. In this case the organizations seem to have been 
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more successful in doing so. This seems quite natural as environmental issues are of a more 
international character.  
 
Given that Sweden is traditionally recognized as a prominent country in these issues, it would 
mean that the Commission would not judge Sweden harshly and this becomes problematic in 
terms of the reliability for the entire Habitats directive (Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, 
interview). Karlsson at SNF and EEB argues that there is a big risk that other countries will 
look at the outcome in the Swedish case and say, if Sweden can do this, then it must be okay, 
since Sweden is very good on environmental issues. Karlsson states that if Sweden is not 
sentenced in proportion to their crime then it would send out the wrong signals to other 
member states and then other cases of violation towards the Habitats directive might surface 
(Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, phone-interview).  
 
As described in the VAT case, EU regulation only functions the way it is implemented by the 
member states, therefore individual countries’ actions matter. Karlsson puts it like this:   
 
Given that all campaigning is based on storytelling and that it is personalized, it becomes extremely important 
with national examples to point out errors in conservations policy. In this case Sweden has personalized the issue 
(Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, phone-interview). 
 
By presenting the question in this way and seeing it as a European question and not a solely 
Swedish question, the organizations can better succeed in getting the Commission to act on 
the matter. Europeanizing the question seems to be a success factor in this case. 
 
4.2.5 How to manage the processes? 
As I have described, much efforts are needed from the organizations to cope, these processes 
are costly and labor intensive for conservation organization and they have a hard time finding 
resources for it. Therefore all the organizations point at the benefit of cooperating with other 
organizations. Alarik explains the difficulty in standing against, in this case two ministries 
that have a lot of resources, which they could for example spend on research that suit their 
cause (Alarik, SNF, 2012, interview). The organizations have complemented each other in 
different ways, even though the responsibilities have not been clearly defined. Since SNF for 
example is the only organization with juridical experts, they handled much of the 
correspondence with the Commission. SRF, even though being a smaller organization than for 
example SNF and WWF have extensive knowledge of the wolf issue, including management, 
scientific and legal aspects on hunting and thus contributed with expertise on these issues 
(Alarik SNF, 2012, interview). WWF Sweden is part of the international organization WWF 
that is very well recognized, also within the European context. Thus, they could function as 
provider of legitimacy towards the Commission. Djurskyddet has been the least active 
organization in this cooperation and has mostly functioned as an additional actor that can 
bring even more weight behind the organizations joint comments (Hagelstedt, Djurskyddet, 
2012, interview). The representative of WWF believes that if it had only been SNF and SRF, 
it might not have been given the same weight. SRF is a much smaller organization, while 
WWF focuses on the whole world. “We provided legitimacy in relation to the Commission 
and when we work together we represent about half a million Swedes” (Anonymous 2, WWF, 
2012, interview). 
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The organizations did obviously not manage to convince the government in Sweden where 
they competed with lobbying groups such as Swedish hunting associations, as well as the 
national government with their entire secretariat. By joining forces and making use of the EU, 
the organizations were however able to achieve results. Otherwise small organizations with 
low levels of resources have engaged extensively in EU related work. The case proves that on 
a general basis Klüver’s theory surely helps us depicting that resources are important in order 
to be successful when choosing to lobby in the EU. However, on an individual basis 
organizations can form alliances to compensate for lack of resources and thereby use EU 
institutions, despite the difficulty of managing such processes. The organizations play on the 
Commissions duty to ensure that EU law is correctly implemented in the member states and 
get the political leverage they need to change national policy from there.  
  
When talking to the organizations, their international cooperation also seems to be important. 
The chairman of SNF is also the chairman of an EU network called the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB). Alaraik explains that SNF has had a long and strong role 
among environmental agencies in Europe and the fact that they also now have their chairman 
in the top of the EEB sees to that the organization has a good knowledge of how the EU 
works. WWF and SNF also describe the importance of having EU competences related to the 
organizations. The questions were run from the national level, by the organizations 
themselves. Furthermore, for example the WWF European policy office simultaneously had 
monthly meetings with the Environmental Commissioner Janez Potocnik, where this 
otherwise national question could be brought up at the European level (Anonymous 2, WWF, 
2012, interview).  
 
Karlsson at SNF and EEB describes that EEB has been helpful partly because it is not easy to 
find your way around in the EU, and being part of a network like EEB can help you with that. 
Furthermore it also gives them the opportunity to bring attention to the Wolf hunt question at 
various meetings with the Commission and the Parliament whenever new things have 
happened regarding the issue. EEB has also written individually to the Commission stating 
the seriousness of this question, which puts more pressure on the Commission (Karlsson, SNF 
and EEB 2012, phone-interview). As I pointed out earlier, the organizations tried to 
Europeanize the question and for this Karlsson’s presidency in the EEB proved to be helpful. 
SNF created an online petition where they collected signatures to a letter addressed to the 
Commissioner, and through EEB and the international contacts even organizations from other 
member states signed the letter and thereby Europeanized the question.  
 
By using EU networks, the organizations take the EU route down via EU based networks that 
try to influence EU institutions that hopefully in turn will influence national policy. In 
Klüver’s theory she dismisses the importance of EU based CSOs and states that these 
organizations often only deal with international interests and questions regarding joint issues 
for organizations in more than one country. The Wolf hunt case shows, just like the VAT 
case, the importance of having key persons within the EU context, holding either EU 
competence and/or political power. In the VAT case the Swedish Chairman in the EESC gave 
weight to the organizations demands and having a representative working in the EECS 
offered a way in to the EU institutions, as well as knowledge about the political processes. 
Likewise, a Swedish chairman in the EEB, could be expected to contribute to lifting the Wolf 
hunt question higher on the EEB’s agenda, as well as offering important knowledge on 
political processes within the EU. The EU based networks are important both in terms of 
providing knowledge and competences, but also to make sure the question is internationally 
recognized.   
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4.2.6 The question heats up 
On the 7
th
 of November 2010, the Environmental Commissioner Janez Potocnik sent a 
personal letter to the Environmental Minister in Sweden, at that time Andreas Carlgren, 
stating that he was concerned about that the Swedish Wolf hunt was not compliant with the 
Habitats directive, and that he should not allow the next licensed hunt on wolfs that was 
planned for the winter of 2011, before sending relevant information and proof of the accuracy 
to the Commission (Potocnik 2010). On the 17
th
 of December 2010, the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency decided on a second licensed hunt on 20 wolves starting on 
the 15
th
 of January 2011, without the minister having replied to the letter from Potocnik. This 
time it was the question of 20 wolfs that were to be shot without any translocation being done, 
as the government had stated that they would do. Therefore the organizations handed in their 
concerns to the Commission again, in a new letter. They were concerned about that the 
government had not fulfilled its promises on planting new wolfs and that they now had 
allowed for a second licensed hunt, and that this hunt just like the first one, was not compliant 
with the Habitat directive and that it would hurt the wolf population in Sweden (CSOs: 2, 
2010). On the 22
nd
 of December 2010, the Swedish minister Andreas Carlgren finally 
responded to the letter by Potocnink, saying that the Swedish wolf population is fragile to bad 
publicity and that licensed hunt was needed to get support from locals to plant new wolfs 
from outside of Sweden (Carlgren 2011).   
  
Finally, in January 2011, the European Commission addressed Sweden with a reasoned 
opinion (which is the first formal step in an infringement procedure), for not following EU 
Environmental legislation and more specifically the Habitats Directive, 92/43/EEC regarding 
the hunting of wolfs. According to article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, the Commission urged Sweden to respond within two months and declared 
its own right to open up an infringement procedure against Sweden if the answers would be 
insufficient (the Commission, Reasoned Opinion, 2011).  
4.2.7 The next hunt is stopped… 
During the summer it became increasingly clear to the government that this issue was going 
to be taken to court by the Commission, if the government didn’t do anything about it. 
Everything culminated in a press conference on the 17
th
 of August 2011. At the press 
conference, Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren and Agriculture Minister Eskil 
Erlandsson declared that the planned licensed hunt was going to be stopped, but only 
temporarily (jagarforbundet.se 2011). All of the organizations seem to be agreeing on the fact 
that the government would be too embarrassed to be taken to court on this matter, and that is 
why they changed the policy at that time. Therefore it is the Commission that has stopped the 
hunt, not the public opinion in Sweden.  
 
The organization had been successful in achieving their goal and Hagelstedt states that even 
Swedish CSOs often are against the EU, Hagelstedt can consider to use EU again if it is 
needed (Hagelstedt, Djurskyddet 2012, interview). All of the organizations further state that 
this has been a learning process.  
 
Learning about political processes in the EU will naturally make it easier and more accessible 
for the organizations to engage in EU questions in the future. Together with the increased 
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focus put on civil society institutions it could therefore be expected that the Europeanization 
of national CSOs will continue.   
4.2.8 …but the question continues 
When the hunt was stopped in 2011, the government only declared a temporary stop and in 
October 2012 the new environmental minister Lena EK (C) declared that the wolf population 
should have a limit of 180 wolfs, far below even the earlier limit that conservation 
organizations thought was too low. The organizations think that the issue of Favourable 
Conservation Status, i.e. how many wolves there should be, is not resolved yet, and that the 
issue needs a broad scientific review before the number of wolves in Sweden can be 
determined. However, before any such hunt had been decided on, the EU Commissioner 
Potocnik, recently addressed Minister Ek with a letter where he clearly stated that a new 
licensed hunt would not be in line with the obligation Sweden has due to the Habitats 
directive (Potocnik 2012). 
 
The question is thus not over yet and it is therefore too early to evaluate the outcome of this 
case but it stands clear that at least one planned licensed hunts on wolfs in Sweden has been 
stopped due to the Commissions comments on the government’s policy. Even though the case 
haven’t been resolve yet the Commissioner has clearly stated that he does not agree with 
Swedish policy in this case.  
 
Apart from the VAT case where the government seems to have no moral difficulties to break 
EU law, in the case of licensed hunt on wolfs the Swedish government seems to be more 
concerned with their reputation as good environmentalists and implementers of EU law. The 
government has stopped one hunt on Wolfs due to the Commissions statements, what will 
happen next we will have to wait and see, but it at least seem clear that the government has a 
harder time on getting complaints from the Commission in this case than in the VAT case.     
4.2.9 Summary of strategies used by CSOs in the Wolf hunt case  
To summarize, in order to achieve results in an EU related question the following strategies 
were used by the CSOs in the Wolf hunt case:  
 
 They joined forces with other CSOs to share resources. 
 They took the Traditional route where they lobby towards the national government but use 
EU policy to strengthen their argumentation.  
 They took the European route down by sending in a complaint to the Commission. They 
followed up the complaint by providing the Commission with expertise knowledge and 
updated information and analyzes, building relations with the Commission’s staff in order to 
get them to act toward the Swedish government.  
 They took the European route down via EU networks to get access to EU competence and 
knowledge, legitimacy and help in the lobbying work towards the Commission and to 
Europeanize the question for influence towards the Commission. The work towards the 
Commission is ultimately aimed at getting the Commission to act against the Swedish 
Government  
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5 Conclusions  
The following section will summarize the previous chapter and provide a holistic account for 
what the case studies have shown in relation to actor centered Europeanization theory. The 
discussions bring forward both acknowledgements of the existing theories’ usefulness, as well 
as their inabilities to explain certain aspects of the cases. Hence, my intention is to fill in the 
gaps of the existing theories and provide relevant suggestions on how to refine and further 
develop the theories within the field. The final remarks emphasize the contributions of this 
study and suggest prospective research.   
 
5.1 Summarizing discussion  
Klüver approaches Europeanization of national non-governmental actors as transferred 
competences to the EU, which puts adaptional pressure on national organizations to lobby 
towards EU institutions. However, arguing that such activities are constrained by lack of 
resources. Therefore, Klüver concludes that the organizations that Europeanize their activities, 
are those with high levels of resources in terms of personnel, representativeness, as well as 
financial resources, and organizations that are not granted as much access to the national 
institutions. Ruzza and Bozzini provide a broader definition of the Europeanization of CSOs, 
than Klüver does, by describing alternative routes to influence EU politics. By recognizing 
both horizontal and vertical interactions between CSOs and institutional actors, one can make 
more accurate analyzes on how CSOs can engage in Europeanizing their activities. By using 
two case studies on domestic CSOs in EU related matters, I have made an attempt to point out 
both the relevance of these theories, as well as their gaps when studying Europeanization of 
CSOs.  
 
The empirical material has revealed the complexity of the processes and the multiple actions 
and strategies taken by the organizations to achieve their goals. The narratives have shown 
that engaging in EU politics is demanding in terms of resources, but at the same time it has 
proved to be easier than most of the organizations had expected. We have also seen that 
resources are not only internal to the organizations, but rather something that can be shared 
with other actors, both institutional and other CSOs, which suggests adding relational factors 
to the analysis. If we look at CSOs as parts of a multidimensional political landscape we will, 
compared to Klüver, have somewhat different thoughts about what is important in terms of 
resources for CSOs to engage in Europeanizing activities. The two cases I have studied are 
the VAT case and the wolf hunt case.   
 
Klüver only refers to Europeanized activities as lobbying work being performed at EU-level.  
In the VAT case it is not fruitful to distinguish actions performed at EU-level as the only 
Europeanized activities, as Klüver does. In the VAT case actions performed at national level 
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are intertwined with work at EU-level and should therefore also be seen as Europeanized 
work.  
 
By taking the National route, the CSOs in the VAT case try to convince the government to act 
on their behalf. The CSOs also engage their grassroots to visualize a larger representativeness 
towards both the government and the EU institutions. The organizations did not only get the 
government to stand up for their cause towards the EU institutions, but also received informal 
help from Swedish civil servants, which enabled a better and more effective lobbying towards 
the EU institutions. Where the organizations lacked competence and experience in working 
with EU related questions, they could compensate by allying with the government, as well as 
with Swedish key persons within the EESC.  
 
It also seems important to lobby on the national level in order to influence EU policy, since it 
is ultimately the member states that decide if policies are implemented or not. In the VAT 
case the national government could be willing to pay potential fines if Sweden was to be 
sentenced in the ECJ, and thus not change the legislation. Despite the fact that EU holds the 
legislative competence in a policy area, it is ultimately the national government that must be 
convinced. Important to notice is however that there seems to be a difference between 
different policy areas, regarding what the Swedish government can accept to be accused of. In 
the Wolf hunt case we rather saw the opposite. The national government was addressed with 
strong accusations by the Commission and chose to change the policy, in order not to be taken 
to court and risk conviction.  
 
In the VAT case the organizations took somewhat different paths depending on their believes. 
While FRII that seemed to be focusing more on the upcoming directive chose to act through a 
EU network, RF, Forum and Civos chose to lobby both nationally and at EU level. The 
European route up can be divided into different types of lobbying, i.e. lobbying towards 
different institutions: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Neither Klüver, nor 
Ruzza and Bozzini consider this division, however it does seem important for the CSOs, in 
terms of their possibilities to get access and influence. We have seen that the Parliament 
seems easier to get access to compared to the Commission, and perhaps even more compared 
to the Council. Hence, when predicting levels of Europeanization when looking at lobbying 
directly towards the EU, one should differentiate between the institutions for more accurate 
analyses.        
 
In the Wolf hunt case, where there was a conflict between conservation CSOs and the national 
government, the organizations could make use of EU policy to strengthen their argumentation 
at the national level. This refers to the Traditional route where the EU is recognized only in 
terms of EU legislation. The organizations could also take the European route down where 
they could play on the Commission’s responsibility for ensuring that EU law is applied 
throughout all member states, since that makes them dependent upon information and 
competence from outside of their secretariat. In the case of wolf hunt, where the organizations 
saw no political openings at the national level, they were instead able to make the 
Commission understand the seriousness of the question and to induce the Commission to 
threaten Sweden to stop licensed hunt, in 2011. Hence, the organizations had to engage in 
costly and time consuming work to be able to provide the Commission with knowledge, 
updates and analyses. Their work was even more challenging by the fact that both the national 
government and the counter organizations did what they could to convince the Commission 
that licensed hunt on wolfs in Sweden does not breach EU law. Standing against strong 
lobbying organizations and especially the government with all of its ministries, the 
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organizations had to find ways to cope with their lack of resources and competences. This 
case shows us how resources can be shared and how dependencies can open up for 
cooperation between CSOs and institutions. I believe that Klüver offers a somewhat 
misleading picture when stating that EU networks are only concerned with “European issues”, 
and that domestic CSOs therefore have to establish representativeness in Brussels themselves. 
In the wolf hunt case, organizations describe the importance of having EU competences 
related to the organizations, without necessarily leaving the question up to the EU networks. 
The issue was run from the national level by the organizations themselves, but they were 
offered help from EU networks in several ways. Partly for competence, partly for additional 
lobbying activities at EU level where the EU networks also used their channels to 
communicate and try to influence the Commission. The EU networks were also helpful in 
Europeanizing the question by offering contacts to political actors in other countries. Making 
it a relevant question in the European context could make the Commission more interested in 
handling the case, since it also made the question more important.   
 
While the case studies have demonstrated different kinds of Europeanization of CSOs, some 
observations bring forward joint conclusions. What neither of the theories recognize, but that 
both my case studies show proof of, is how organizations can pool resources and thus make it 
possible even for smaller and resource weak organizations to Europeanize their lobbying 
activities. The cooperation takes different forms and includes the sharing of both personnel 
and financial resources, as well as joining forces for better representativeness. This relates 
also to those key persons that could be found in each case. Having representatives within the 
EU context offers both crucial EU competence and a way into the EU sphere.  
5.2 Final remarks  
Concluding the statements in the summarizing discussion, I would like to point out the 
benefits of Ruzza and Bozzini’s theory of alternative routes to EU politics, since they are very 
useful in helping us recognizing both vertical and horizontal interactions, seeing also the 
national level as an important arena for Europeanization. When dealing with Europeanization 
processes we need to recognize what the CSOs can benefit from, having institutional actors 
on their side. I hope to have made clear that the roles of CSOs and explanatory factors for 
their Europeanization are intertwined. Therefore, when trying to predict how CSOs will act in 
European policy matters or how those actions will be perceived, we must carefully consider 
those predictions, keeping in mind the multitude of factors that come into play in such a 
process.  
 
I believe the case studies have showed that in-depth case studies of Europeanization of CSOs 
is a much needed task, as it can bring up alternative explanations and provide a more 
comprehensive picture, than what would be possible in a quantitative study.  
 
Apart from previous theories on Europeanization of CSOs, I suggest that relational factors 
must be considered in order to explain the CSOs behaviors, since it enables also domestic 
organizations with fewer resources to engage in Europeanizing activities. I also suggest that 
we need to differentiate between the EU institutions when predicting what is needed from the 
organizations to get access and influence. Finally I point out the importance of recognizing 
the actions of domestic CSOs in Europeanization research. Even though these domestic CSOs 
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are not as visible in Brussels as private interest groups and EU networks, they are learning 
and building competences on how to engage in EU politics from a national level. By 
networking and using alternative strategies, even domestic CSOs have proved to be important 
actors in EU politics.  
 
I believe there are several factors that are relevant in explaining why and how domestic CSOs 
Europeanize their activities. To gather additional explanatory factors I suggest both more in-
depth studies that can inductively search for variables, as well as quantitative studies that can 
use comparative methods to test explanatory factors.  
 
I also see the need to approach the bottom-up effects of Europeanization where national 
political actors are seen as independent agents of change. It is important to recognize that a 
changed civil society can also come to affect the EU in itself and not only the other way 
around. In the VAT case we experienced the start of an umbrella organization that thanks to 
this EU matter could join together, otherwise being a very diverse civil society. Also in the 
Wolf hunt case individual organizations that had not cooperated before joined forces to cope 
with the EU policy processes. One of the problems with civil society is that there is a 
perception of organizations being unable to cooperate among diverse interests. In relation to 
these findings I would therefore suggest that further research also pays attention to the 
possibilities the EU can bring to domestic CSOs to legitimize their organizations and to unite 
an otherwise divided civil society. By analyzing these case studies we can see that by putting 
time and effort into these questions, the organizations learn and build EU competence. The 
organizations believe that this knowledge and competence will become useful in the future 
and that engaging in EU matters is not something that will end with these questions being 
resolved. Hence, my suggestion for future research within the field of Europeanization, is to 
continue investigating the Europeanization of domestic CSOs, and when doing so considering 
actions that take place outside of the Brussels sphere and keeping the mind open to what 
incentives may lie behind the organizations’ Europeanization.  
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Executive Summary  
Europeanization has become a key concept to explain one of the most prominent changes in 
the coordination of public policy in our times. Member states entering the European Union 
(EU) and the transfer of competences to EU level that comes with it, affects both public 
instructions as well as non-governmental political actors. The primary focus within the 
Europeanization literature has been on how EU integration and transferred legislative 
competences affect policy adaption at the domestic level (e.g. Cowles, Carporaso & Risse 
2001; Graziano & Vink 2008; Olsen 2002). But due to the development of a non-
governmental sphere at EU level, existing of both private interest groups in the EU and the 
birth of several EU based CSOs, an increase in research on private interest representation at 
EU level in Brussels has also appeared (Smismans, 2003, 2008; Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; 
Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009).  
 
Little is however said about domestic CSOs and their integration in EU politics. By zooming 
out of Brussels one comes to realize that also domestic CSOs have started to engage in EU 
politics. Two cases that display such behavior from domestic CSOs is the debate over 
licensed hunt on wolfs and the question if non-profit organizations should be allowed to 
be exempted from paying and register VAT or not. By making in depth case studies of 
these two political processes I have tried to provide useful empirical observations on political 
actors that not yet have been addressed extensively in the Europeanization literature. 
Secondly I also have made an attempt at refine and complement the theories that actually 
existed on the subject of Europeanization of national non-governmental actors.  
 
The actor centered theory which I have used as a basis for the development of theory is 
Klüvers (2010) theory on Europeanization of interest groups lobbying activities. Klüver 
approaches Europeanization of national non-governmental actors as transferred competences 
to EU which puts adaptional pressure on domestic organizations to lobby towards EU 
institutions but that such activities are constrained by lack of recourse. Therefore 
organizations with high levels of resources in terms or financial, personnel and 
representativeness and organization that are not granted as much access towards national 
institutions are the ones that Europeanize their activities. 
 
To broaden the view on what strategies CSOs can use besides lobbying towards EU 
institution I have used Ruzza and Bozzinis (2008) theory on alternative routes to EU for 
domestic CSOs. By recognizing both horizontal and vertical interactions between CSOs and 
institutional actors by the help of Ruzza and Bozzinis theory more accurate analyzes over how 
CSOs can engage in Europeanizing activities were made possible.  
 
Even though complementing Klüver’s theory, and especially the resource part of it with 
Ruzza and Bozzini’s alternative routes to EU there were still aspects of the two cases that 
could not be explained and I have therefore tried to complement existing theories with my 
own suggestions.   
 
The two case studies revealed the complexity of the processes and the multiple actions and 
strategies taken by the organizations to achieve their goals. The narratives have shown that 
engaging in EU politics is both demanding in terms of resources but that it is also easier than 
most of the organizations had expected. It has also shown that resources is not something that 
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only exist inside the organizations but can be shared with other actors both institutional and 
other CSOs which suggest adding relational factors to the analysis.  
 
I also wished to bring forward that if we view upon CSOs as parts of a multidimensional 
political landscape we will have somewhat different thoughts about what is important in terms 
of resources for CSOs to achieve their goals and when and why the start to engage in 
Europeanizing activities. In the VAT case it is not fruitful to distinguish actions aimed at EU-
level directly as the only Europeanized activities, as Klüver does, for as we saw the 
organizations work at the national level is intertwined with the EU work. By taking the 
National route the CSOs tries to convince the government to act on their behalf. The CSOs 
also engage their grassroots to visualize a larger representativeness towards both the 
government and towards EU institutions.   
 
The organizations in the VAT case did not only get the government to stand up for their cause 
towards EU institutions but they also received informal help from national governments 
which enabled a better and more effective lobbying towards the EU institutions. Where the 
organizations lacked competence and experience in working with EU related questions they 
could compensate that lack by ally with the government as well as Swedish key persons 
within the EESC.  
 
The national level also seems important to lobby towards to influence the question since it is 
ultimately the member states who decide if that policy is implemented or not. Important to 
notice is however that there seems to be a differences in policy area and what the Swedish 
government can accept to be accused for and not. In the wolf hunt case we rather see the 
opposite that the national government has when been addressed with strong accusations from 
the Commission chosen to change policy in order to not be taken to court and risk conviction.  
 
In the VAT case the organization took somewhat different paths depending on their believes. 
While FRII who seemed to be focusing more on the upcoming directive chose to act through 
an EU network, RF, Forum and Civos chose to lobby both nationally and at EU level. The 
European route up can be divided in lobbying towards different institutions, the Commission 
and the Parliament. This dived that is being done by neither Klüver nor Ruzza and Bozzini 
seems important in terms of the possibility to access and influence for the CSOs. Recognizing 
that there might be a difference in how accessible the institutions are to CSOs seems to be 
important. When predicting levels of Europeanization as in lobbying directly towards EU we 
should separate between the institutions for more accurate analysis.        
 
In the wolf hunt case where there was a conflict between conservation CSOs and the national 
government the organizations could by taking the European route down achieve policy 
change at the national level in a question where they saw now openings at the national level. 
The organizations could use the fact that EU holds the legislative competence in that policy 
area. Getting the Commission to understand the seriousness of the question in turn made the 
Commission threaten Sweden to stop licensed hunt both in 2011 and 2012.  
 
To be able to achieve their goals the organizations in the wolf hunt case had to engage in 
costly and time consuming work to be able to provide the Commission with expertise, updates 
and analyzes. Standing against strong lobbying organizations and especially the government 
with all of its ministries the organizations had to find ways to cope with lack of resources and 
competences. This case also point at the importance of recognizing the CSOs as actors in a   
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multidimensional political landscape where resources can be shared and dependencies opens 
up for cooperation.  
 
I believe Klüver offers a somewhat misleading picture when stating that EU networks are 
only concerned with “European issues” and that domestic CSOs therefore have to establish 
representativeness in Brussels themselves. In the wolf hunt case organizations describe the 
importance of having EU competences related to the organizations without necessarily leave 
the question up to EU networks. The questions was run from the national level from the 
organizations themselves but was offered help from EU networks in several ways. Partly for 
competence, partly for additional lobbying activities at EU level where the EU networks also 
used their channels to communicate and try to influence the Commission. The EU networks 
were also helpful in Europeanizing the question by offering contacts to political actors in 
other countries. Making it a relevant question in the European context could make the 
Commission more interest in handling the case since it becomes also principally important.   
 
While the case studies explained different kinds of Europeanization of CSOs some 
observations brought forward joint conclusions. What neither of the theories by Klüver and 
Ruzza and Bozzini recognizes but that both my case studies shows proof of is how 
organizations can pool resources and thus make possible even for smaller and recourse 
weaker organizations to Europeanize their lobbying activities.  
 
The cases have showed that in-depth case studies of Europeanization of CSOs is a much 
needed task. It can bring out alternative explanations and provide a more comprehensive 
picture than what would be possible in a quantative studies. Apart from previous theories on 
Europeanization of CSOs I suggest that relational factors must be considered in order to 
explain the CSOs behaviors for it enables also national organizations with less recourse to 
engage in Europeanizing activities. I finally suggest that we need to divide between EU 
institutions when predicting what is needed from the organizations to get access and 
influence.  
 
Concluding the study I pointed out the benefits of Ruzza and Bozzinis theory of alternative 
routes to EU politics for they are much useful in helping us recognizing both vertical and 
horizontal interactions, seeing also the national level as an important arena for 
Europeanization. When dealing with Europeanization processes we need to be aware of how 
EU is affecting CSOs abilities and possibilities to function as counterparts to the public 
institutions at both EU-level and nationally as well as recognizing what they can benefit for 
having institutional actors on their side. I hope to have made clear that the roles of CSOs and 
explanatory factors for their Europeanization are intertwined. When trying to predict how 
CSOs will act in European policy matters or how those actions will be perceived, we must 
therefore go about those predictions carefully and with respect for the multitude of factors that 
come into play in such a process.  
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were not recorded for practical reasons, only handwritten notes are accessible. Otherwise all 
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Appendix 2 – CSOs in the VAT case  
 Brief description of basic features of the organizations included in the investigation – VAT case 
 Forum The Swedish Sports 
Confederation 
(Riksidrottsförbundet (RF)) 
Civos - Civil society 
organizations in partnership 
Swedish Fundraising Council 
(Frivilligorganisationernas 
insamlingsråd (FRII)) 
Key description 
 
Forum is an umbrella 
organization for Swedish 
NGOs involved in social work. 
Their aim is to improve the 
opportunities for voluntary 
social work within Sweden 
through influencing public 
opinion, facilitating the 
exchange of knowledge and 
introducing new methods of 
work.  
RF is the umbrella organization 
of the Swedish 
Sports movement. They speak 
on behalf of the united sports 
movement in contacts with 
politicians, the government and 
other institutions/organizations, 
coordinate the sports movement 
in fields like research and 
development, provide and in 
certain areas act in place of the 
government, i.e. through 
distributing governmental grants 
to sports. 
Civos consist of collaboration 
between organizations from 
different sectors of society. 
Civos goal is to “strengthen civil 
society and non-profit 
organizations' common interests” 
Civos was founded to gain more 
influence by cooperating among 
the organizations. One of the 
reasons was also to be able to 
better connect with civil society 
organization at an international 
level. Forum is a member of 
Civos. 
FRII is an interest group working 
for secure fundraising. FRII is 
working to increase the 
credibility for fundraising 
organizations through working 
with quality assurance, training 
and running their structures to 
reduce barriers to data collection 
and to promote and market the 
sector towards donors, agencies 
and organizations.  
Members 
35 member organization with 
the right to vote and 8 
associated members  
3 million individual members in 
22 000 clubs. 
18 member organizations 145 member organizations 
Funding 
Member fees  Public grants Member fees Member fees and activity 
incomes   
Organization/size 
Staff of 12 employees Staff of about 100 employees Civos has no own secretariat, 
instead the work in this 
organization is carried out by the 
board members themselves with 
now salary from the organization. 
Staff of 2 employees 
Established year 1993 1903 2009  
     Source: Official websites of the selected organizations 
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Appendix 3 – CSOs in the Wolf hunt case 
 Brief description of basic features of the organizations included in the investigation – Wolf hunt question 
 Swedish Society for Nature Conservation 
(Naturskyddsföreningen (SNF)) 
World Wildlife Foundation Sweden 
(Världsnaturfonden (WWF)) 
Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet Sverige 
(Djurskyddet)) 
Key description 
SNF is a national CSO working with nature and 
environmental issues. SNF is aiming at 
strengthening the sense of nature in parallel with 
political influence. SNF is also working to 
strengthen consumer power.  SNF is often a 
consultative body towards the government.   
WWF Sweden is part of the international 
non-governmental organization WWF that 
is working with nature and environmental 
issues. WWF works politically and often 
function as consultative body towards the 
government.   
Djurskyddet Sverige is a national CSO working to 
improve animal welfare. Djurskyddets mission is 
to spread knowledge about how to handle different 
kinds of animals in the best way and advise the 
people of various animal welfare issues. 
Djurskyddet also works politically and often 
function as consultative body towards the 
government.   
Members 
24 counties and 270 municipal circles, about 
190,000 individual members 
190,000 individual supporters in Sweden 60 local clubs and approximately 14,000 individual 
members 
Funding 
Mostly from voluntary donations, membership fees 
and public grants 
Mostly from voluntary donations and 
public grants. 
Mostly voluntary donations and membership fees.  
Organization/size Staff of 90 employees  Staff of 70 employees Staff of 10 employees 
Established year 
1909 WWF 1961 and WWF Sweden 1971 The precursor to Djurskyddet was founded in 1897. 
Became Djurskyddet Sverige in 2004 
     Source: Official websites of the selected organizations 
 
